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Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court:
How the Court of Arbitration for Sport
Can Do Its Job Better
By Michael Straubel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Marion Jones, a three time Gold Medalist at the Sydney Olympic
Games, referred to it as a kangaroo court.1 Others have called it an
innovative and efficient way to settle the sports world's disputes.
2
Whatever one thinks of the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"), it
is emerging as a major institution in the sports world, and as an example
of the need for the unification of private international law. 3 Because of
this prominent role, it is necessary to understand and evaluate the
complex and sometimes contradictory system employed by the CAS.
The need for this analysis is heightened by the growing international
profile of sport doping cases, and the center-stage that the CAS and its
affiliates are likely to have in the adjudication of these cases. This
* Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law,
Head Cross Country Coach and Assistant Track Coach, Valparaiso University. I would like to
thank and acknowledge the valuable input and help of Hollie Tanguay in preparing this Article.
Without her help, I could not have done it. I would also like to thank Debbie Bercik for her
assistance and diligence in meeting my deadline demands.
1. Tom Weir & Jon Swartz, Jones Wants To Go Public with Fight, USA TODAY, June 17,
2004, at Cl. Marion Jones won the 100 meters, 200 meters, and was on the winning 4 x 100
meter relay team at the 2000 Sydney Olympics. She has been questioned and investigated by the
United States Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA"), but as of the date of drafting this Article, she
has not been charged with a doping offense. The USADA has refused to comment further on
Marion's case.
2. See Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for Olympic Ailments: The
International Olympic Committee's Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Future for the
Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 347, 347-48 (1994)
(stating that the CAS is the "ideal vehicle for administering such disputes").
3. As will be discussed later in this Article, CAS has established itself as a single judicial
entity with worldwide jurisdiction. In the world of doping adjudication, a single entity with
consistent doctrines is very desirable. However, differences of opinion between decisions from
CAS panels and AAA-CAS panels, and even between CAS panels themselves, has created
confused doping case doctrine. One of the conclusions of this Article will be that this confusion
of doctrine is harming the CAS, harming athletes' rights, and harming the Olympic Movement's
fight against harmful performance enhancing drugs.
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evaluation and analysis will illustrate that the CAS must shed its
original commercial dispute settlement structure and adapt to the unique
demands of adjudicating and settling doping accusations.
As the 2004 Olympics approached, the doping cases that came out of
the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative ("BALCO") investigation 4
brought the CAS to the attention of the general public, and brought
criticism aimed at the CAS. Star athletes preparing for the United
States Olympic Trials and Athens Olympic Games were charged with
doping violations that would ultimately be decided by the CAS.5
Suddenly, the future of these athletes and possibly the outcome of the
Olympic Games would be decided by an obscure institution located in
Lausanne, Switzerland. Consequently, the sports world, the media, the
athletes and their lawyers, and the general public began to ask questions
about the role, function, and ultimately the fairness of the previously
anonymous CAS. 6
In their subsequent investigation of the CAS, athletes and other
interested parties learned that the CAS is the judicial institution (branch)
of the Olympic Movement. 7  The CAS-in addition to hearing private
disputes among athletes, teams, and leagues-decides disciplinary
claims brought by the enforcement agencies of the Olympic
Movement. 8  For instance, the United States Anti-Doping Agency,
4. The BALCO investigation is a United States Federal Government investigation of the Bay
Area Laboratory Co-Operative for possible tax crimes. As a result of that investigation, a number
of athletes, both professional and Olympic athletes, testified before a federal grand jury.
Information has led to charges against four athletes for doping violations even though none of the
four athletes have tested positive for banned drugs. Pete Carey, Lifetime Ban Sought for
Montgomery; Doping agency alleges use of illegal substances, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2004, at 3.
5. See Dick Patrick, Going CAS Route Risky for Runner, USA TODAY, June 29, 2004, at C12
(discussing athletes' decisions to seek CAS arbitration following USADA's push for lifetime
bans).
6. See Liz Robbins, Lower Standard of Proof Angers Athletes and Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2004, at D2 (noting USADA's desire to use the "comfortable satisfaction" standard instead of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" when deciding whether to ban athletes for drug use against stiff
opposition from athletes and their respective lawyers).
7. The "Olympic Movement" refers to an umbrella of international sport encompassing the
Olympic games and other international competitions (e.g., World Championships), the governing
bodies of those competitions, and related institutions (such as the World Anti-Doping Agency and
the Court of Arbitration for Sport). For a detailed explanation of the Olympic Movement's
governing structure, see Michael Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping
Control Process In International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REv. 523 pasim (2002) (detailing and
discussing the pre-Sydney doping control system, doping control, due process, and post-Sydney
improvements).
8. See INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, STATUTES OF THE
BODIES WORKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF SPORTS-RELATED DISPUTES S12 (June 30, 1984)
[hereinafter CAS CODE] (arbitrating and mediating disputes arising within the field of sports in
conformity with the Procedural Rules), available at http://www.tas-cas.org. These sorts of
1204 [Vol. 36
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("USADA"), acted as the enforcement agency in investigating and
bringing charges against athletes implicated in the BALCO
controversy.9 Those athletes had the option of contesting the charges
before the CAS or the North American Office of CAS, operating as the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA-CAS"). 10 Thus, the CAS
acts as a surrogate court for the various sports bodies around the world
that end up prosecuting doping claims against athletes.
However, Olympic athletes are not the only athletes wondering about
the CAS and its affiliates. As the BALCO investigation implicated
professional sports like baseball and football, some began to wonder if
professional athletes should be treated like Olympic athletes. Many saw
the efforts of the USADA and the doping rules of the Olympic
Movement to be much more effective than the relatively weak rules and
enforcement efforts of the professional sports leagues. 1' Members of
Congress and others discussed applying the Olympic Movement's
doping rules and enforcement measures to professional athletes. 12  If
changes such as these were effected, the CAS and the AAA-CAS would
begin hearing professional athletes' cases, and would influence the
sports world on an even larger stage.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the structure, operation, and
practice of the CAS and the AAA-CAS to determine if they are fair,
impartial, and independent institutions that are achieving their stated
goal of creating a system of jurisprudence that harmonizes and fairly
applies the principles of the sports world. 13  While the CAS will be
examined in its entirety, the primary focus will be on how the CAS is
equipped to handle doping cases, which seem to be the future of CAS
arbitrations. Additionally, though the CAS family includes a
charges can be brought by any International Federation, National Olympic Committee, the IOC,
or any body acting on behalf of those entities such as the USADA and the World Anti-Doping
Agency ("WADA").
9. See Carey, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the anti-doping agency's proposed bans against
several track athletes).
10. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR ARBITRATION INITIATED
BY THE UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY R-57 (2004) [hereinafter AAA-CAS
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22251; Patrick,
supra note 5, at C 12.
11. James Kuhnhenn, Senators Rip Union's Steroids Stance, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2004, at § 4
p.1 (quoting Senator John McCain as warning that baseball was "about to become fraud");
Congress, Officials Seek Steroid Laws, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2004, at 7.
12. Kuhnhenn, supra note 11, at § 4 p. 1.
13. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 11 1998-2000, at xxx
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (noting that in more than fifteen years of existence, the CAS has
continued to evolve by the creation of a new structure, an increase in the number of arbitrators,
and through the expansion of new offices in North America and Oceania).
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decentralized office headquartered in Australia, only the CAS and the
AAA-CAS will be examined. 14
To further this examination, this Article will first lay a foundation by
examining the history and development of the CAS and the AAA-
CAS. 15  The next Section will take an in-depth look at the operating
rules and procedures as they now stand. This Article will then
examine and make suggestions for improvement on the various
controversial questions of CAS operations: (1) how CAS and AAA-
CAS arbitrators are selected; 17 (2) whether the two institutions are
indeed impartial and independent;18 (3) whether CAS panels have an
adequate choice of laws to adjudicate fairly and correctly;' 9 (4) how the
lack of available precedent effects the arbitration process; 20 and finally
(5) what standards ought to be employed considering the varied and
undefined nature of CAS cases. 2 1  This Article then concludes by
suggesting that the CAS, in doping cases, cannot conduct business as
usual and should create a second chamber to exclusively hear doping
cases and specifically tailor new practices for that second chamber.22
It. BACKGROUND
The CAS and its offspring, the AAA-CAS, were both conceived to
deal with crises of legitimacy in the sports world. They arose from
commercial dispute resolution parentage beginning with answering
tough questions concerning their legitimacy, and more recently, about
14. A helpful (if mixed) analogy is to think of the CAS as a parent corporation with its
headquarters and primary place of operations in Switzerland, and two branch offices in the United
States and Australia. Although these two offices operate relatively autonomously, the
headquarters in Switzerland has ultimate authority, serving as a "supreme court" with appellate
jurisdiction.
15. See infra Part II.A (discussing the origins of the CAS, challenges faced by the CAS in
1994 and the addition made to the CAS in 1996).
16. See infra Part II.B (discussing the application, jurisdiction, and administration of the
Ordinary Division Rules and the Appeals Division as well as the AAA-CAS North American
Rules).
17. See infra Part II.A (discussing the process of creating a master list of arbitrators as well as
the selection process for panel members).
18. See infra Part IL.B (examining the institutional independence of the CAS from the IOC
and other bodies of the Olympic Movement).
19. See infra Part ILl.C (evaluating whether participants have an adequate choice of laws when
gaps occur in the CAS Code).
20. See infra Part III.D (analyzing the effect of unclear or unavailable precedent in CAS panel
decisions).
21. See infra Part Ill.E (appraising the appropriateness of the use of either a strict liability
standard, a 'comfortable satisfaction' standard or a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard).
22. See infra Part IV (concluding that the CAS's current structure is appropriate for deciding
contract cases, but not sufficient for dealing with doping cases).
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their fitness to address doping accusations. Thus, it is important to
understand their parallel development and the various influences that
have shaped their dispute resolution procedure and doctrine. This
understanding is also crucial to appreciate what the two have achieved,
and have yet to achieve.
The CAS was created to bring order to the chaotic and inconsistent
world of international sports adjudications. These had previously been
handled by various bodies with different ideologies and far-ranging
adjudication and settlement methodologies. Similarly, the AAA-CAS
was created to deal with the chaotic, inconsistent, and perhaps even
corrupt adjudication system administered by United States national
governing bodies ("NGBs"). 23 In forging these two new institutions,
the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") looked to the most
established and successful examples of private dispute settlement:
commercial arbitration. Thus, bodies such as the International Chamber
of Commerce were drawn from, and AAA-CAS went as far as adopting
(with modifications) the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Finally, both institutions, in ironically lock-
step procession, amended their operating rules to respond to doubts
about their independence: the CAS created the International Council of
Arbitration for Sport ("ICAS") in 1994 and the AAA-CAS amended its
Supplementary Procedures as recently as 2005.
This Section will fully explore the history, relationship, and operating
24
rules of CAS and AAA-CAS. This exploration will demonstrate the
influence that the commercial arbitration model has had on both
institutions, and the additional influence of civil law traditions on CAS.
Through this exploration, some of the structural weaknesses, with
regards to handling doping cases, will be exposed.
A. History and Development of the CAS
The history of CAS is one of dramatic transformation that led to its
now prominent role in the sports world. Its origins and initial structure
raised doubts about its ability to be impartial. This initial concern has
23. A national governing body is the organization that operates on behalf of the International
Federations ("]Fs") within each individual country. Straubel, supra note 7, at 532. The IFs sit
just below the IOC and each IF governs an individual sport. Id. The IFs can only operate with
the "blessing" of the IOC to have its sport become part of the Olympic games. Id. Both the CAS
and the AAA-CAS were created by the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC"), in large
part as a response to a flood of international criticism that the decisions of United States NGBs
and the USOC on doping cases were nothing more that cover-ups. See id. at 525-40 (detailing
several incidents of sport doping and how it was handled by the nation's NGBs).
24. See infra Parts I.A-B (explaining the history and development of the CAS and the AAA-
CAS).
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been quelled, however, by change and expansion within CAS, a
malleability that has garnered respect from the international community,
and hopefully speaks to its ability to confront further problems moving
forward.
1. Origins of the CAS
The attempt to create a single tribunal to settle the growing number of
international sports disputes began with an International Olympic
Committee ("IOC") working group headed by IOC member and
International Court of Justice Judge K6ba Mbaye in 1982.25 This
working group set out to create a tribunal that could settle international
disputes quickly and inexpensively, 26  and this resulted in the
establishment of the Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.27 This
statute was ratified by the IOC in 1983 and CAS began operation in
1984.28
The Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport required a master list
of sixty arbitrators for parties to choose from. Fifteen of these
arbitrators were appointed by the IOC, fifteen by the International
Federations ("IF"), fifteen by the National Olympic Committees
("NOCs"), and the final fifteen were appointed by the IOC President
from outside the other three groups (1OC, IF, and NOC).2 9 The original
statute created only a single division, as compared to the Ordinary
Division and Appellate Division established later.30  All of the CAS's
operating expenses were covered by the IOC and, in turn, only the IOC
could amend the statute.
31
From 1984 to 1991, the CAS saw very few disputes generally, and
virtually no disciplinary cases. 32 This changed in 1991, however, whenthe International Equestrian Federation ("FEI") adopted a CAS model
25. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxiv
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (describing the creation of statutes that would ultimately be known as
the "Court of Arbitration for Sport").
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at vii.
30. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining fully the transformation of the tribunals in light of cases
arising in the early to mid- 1990s).
31. Gundel v. CAS, CAS 119 (March 15, 1993), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 271
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
32. To illustrate the changing demands on the CAS, between 1984 and 1991 only 34 requests
for arbitration were filed with the CAS, whereas in 2003 there were 107 filed. See Arbitration for
Sport, Statistics, tbl. 1, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/stat/frmstat.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2005).
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clause that, in essence, granted the right to appeal disciplinary decisions
to the CAS.3 3 Even though the CAS did not at that time have an
appellate division, FEI decisions taken to the CAS were treated like
appeals, with de novo review provided.34
2. 1994 Challenge and Changes
In 1993, Elmar Gundel, a German-born jockey, appealed an FEI
disciplinary decision to the CAS.35 Unhappy with the subsequent CAS
decision that basically upheld the FEI decision, Gundel challenged the
impartiality and independence of the CAS under the Swiss Statute on
Private International Law.36  The essence of Gundel's claim was that
the CAS was controlled by, or was not strictly independent from, the
IFs and the FEI, as one of the IFs. While the Swiss Federal Tribunal
37
found the CAS to be independent from the IFs, it expressed concern
about the CAS's independence from the IOC.38  The Swiss Federal
Tribunal pointed to three connections between the IOC and the CAS
that raised concern about the CAS's independence: (1) the CAS was
almost entirely funded by the IOC; (2) the IOC appointed up to half of
the arbitrators to the master list; and (3) only the IOC could amend the
CAS Statute.
39
As a direct result of the Gundel decision, the CAS redrafted its basic
enabling statute, the Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, to
address the concerns of the Swiss Federal Tribunal.4 ° In the Code of
33. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxv-
xxvi (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (adopting the CAS model arbitration clause binding the parties to
the judgment and mandating their cooperation).
34. Under the Statute of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, all cases were treated as an initial
arbitrations. Therefore, all were decided as if they were being heard for the first time, with both
judgments of fact and law vulnerable to review.
35. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxv
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (reducing the period of suspension for horse rider, but upholding the
imposition of a fine).
36. See id. at xxvi (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (noting how the Gundel judgment led to major
reform of the CAS).
37. The Swiss Federal Tribunal acts as a supreme court for questions of federal law in
Switzerland as opposed to questions of canton law. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The New Swiss
Constitution and Reform of the Federal Judiciary, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/
swisscor1.htm (last visited April 13, 2005).
38. See A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment
of 27 May 2003, at para. 3 (discussing a case brought against two cross-country skiers competing
in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City, Utah where the plaintiffs argued that "the
CAS [was] not an independent tribunal in a dispute in which the IOC [was] a party").
39. Id.
40. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxvi
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (discussing the revision of the statute to make it more efficient).
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Sports-related Arbitration, the CAS adopted three major changes. First,
the Code created the ICAS, which was designed to stand between the
CAS, as the arbitration body, and the IOC, as the administrative body,
by carrying out many management functions.4 1  The ICAS was now
responsible for approving the appointment of arbitrators to the master
list, hearing challenges to arbitrators, and setting the CAS's budget.42
Second, the CAS's funding was diversified to include other sources,
thus reducing the IOC's percentage of the funding. 43  Third, the CAS
was divided into an Ordinary Division and an Appellate Division.44
The Ordinary Division was charged with management of first time
disputes (mainly those of a commercial nature) while the Appellate
Division was designed to handle appeals from IF disciplinary
decisions.45
3. 1996 Additions
In 1996, the CAS family-and hence level of service-expanded
further when it established two decentralized offices and an ad hoc
tribunal at the Atlanta Olympic Games.46  The two decentralized
offices, one in North America and the other in Australia, were
established to allow for local dispute settlements. In accordance with its
local focus, the North American office uses American Arbitration
Association administrators and arbitrators, and has its own set of
procedural rules. Despite these local characteristics, AAA-CAS
41. See A. & B., Swiss Fed. Tribunal at para. 3.3.1 (describing the events leading toward the
creation of ICAS and its structure and function); CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S2 (stating that the
"task of ICAS is to facilitate the settlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration and
mediation and to safeguard the independence of the CAS and the rights of the parties").
42. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at B.
S6. The ICAS exercises the following functions:
3. It appoints personalities who are to constitute the list of arbitrators and the list of
CAS mediators and can remove them from lists (Article S3);
4. It exercises those functions concerning the challenge and removal of arbitrators, and
any other functions which the Procedural Rules confer upon it;
5.2. It approves the ICAS budget prepared by the CAS Court Office.
Id.
43. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of 27
May 2003, at para. 3.3.1, translation available at http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/
SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
44. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S3 ("It comprises an ordinary Arbitration Division and an
Appeals Arbitration Division.").
45. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxviii
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002).
46. Id.
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decisions may still be appealed to the CAS.
4 7
Since the Atlanta ad hoc tribunal in 1996, other ad hoc tribunals have
been established at the 1998 Nagano, 2000 Sydney, 2002 Salt Lake
City, and 2004 Athens Olympic Games. An ad hoc tribunal was also
established at the Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games in 1998.48 The
primary responsibility of these ad hoc tribunals is to quickly decide
disputes, within twenty-four to forty-eight hours.4 9 They achieve this
shortened process by employing a separate set of operating rules from
the two permanent divisions, and by selecting arbitrators from a list of
twelve. V
B. CAS Rules and Regulations
This survey of the procedural and operating rules employed by the
CAS will reveal two separate roles filled by the organization, and the
tension spawned by these disparate functions. On one hand, the CAS
functions as a private dispute settlement body, with a corresponding
emphasis on confidentiality and informal procedures. Alternatively, the
CAS must also act as a public settlement body, with a need to create
precedent and behave like a traditional court. Emblematic of this
division are two unwritten CAS procedures: (1) the use of the CAS
clerks to brief arbitrators; and (2) the decision to publish some awards
and not others. In order to further develop and meet evolving
challenges properly, these contradictions will have to identified and
addressed.
1. CAS Rules
The CAS is based in Lausanne, Switzerland and is divided into two
divisions: an Ordinary Division that hears initial cases and an Appeals
Division that handles review of decisions from other sports bodies. The
Code of Sports-Related Arbitration contains rules common to both
divisions as well as rules specific to each of the two divisions.
2. Common Rules
Lausanne is the seat of all arbitration proceedings, regardless of
47. See AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-49A (explaining that
appeals may be made either by the athlete or by the applicable IF and appeals filed under these
rules are heard in the United States).
48. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxix
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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where they are physically held. 51 Effectively, this ensures that certain
municipal laws of Switzerland will govern all arbitrations.52  An
arbitration will be conducted in either English or French depending on
the parties' agreement. 53 In the event that the parties cannot agree on a
language, the president of the division will choose either French or
English.54
The list of potential arbitrators for both panels is created by the
ICAS. 55 Although the ICAS selects arbitrators for the master list, three-
fifths of that list consists of arbitrators first nominated by the IOC, IFs,
and NOCs, diluting the ICAS power of appointment. 56 The remaining
two-fifths are to be-in equal parts-selected with an eye toward
protecting the interests of athletes, and thus independent from the IOC,
IFs, and NOCs. 57  Further, the master list of arbitrators shall be a fair
representation of the continents and different judicial cultures of the
world.58 Each arbitrator must be legally trained, possess recognized
competence in sports law or international arbitration, and have a
command of either French or English. 59  Each arbitrator serves a
renewable four-year term on the master list and takes an oath to be
objective and independent. 60  Finally, each arbitrator must disclose any
51. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S 1.
52. According to the analysis of several courts and the Presidents of the CAS ad hoc Divisions
for the Atlanta and Sydney Games, there is a separation between the legal seat of an arbitration
and the physical site of an arbitration. The legal seat of the arbitration is a choice of the
municipal law that will govern the procedure of the arbitration and any challenge to the result of
the arbitration. Therefore, by choosing Lausanne, all CAS arbitrations are governed only by
Swiss law. Specifically, when a hearing is physically held outside Switzerland, and one party is
not Swiss, Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act will govern. See Raguz v.
Sullivan & ORS, Supreme Ct. of New South Wales Ct. App. 240 (Sept. 1, 2000) (holding that the
agreement in this case was not a "domestic arbitration agreement because the agreed judicial
'seat' or 'place' of arbitration was Switzerland"); Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 2
Lloyd's Rep. 48, Queen's Bench Div., Comm. Ct. (Dec. 22, 1992) (finding that the arbitration
clause provided London as the seat of arbitration and the procedure was to be conducted in
accordance with the supervisory jurisdiction of the English Courts).
53. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R29.
54. Id.
55. Id.atS6&S14.
56. One-fifth of the list of CAS arbitrators shall be selected from persons nominated by the
IOC, another one-fifth from a list nominated by the IFs, and another one-fifth from a list
nominated by the NOCs. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S14.
57. One-fifth of the list of arbitrators are to be appointed with the view of safeguarding the
interests of athletes and another one-fifth of the list is to be persons independent of the IOC, IFs,
and NOC. However, the Code does not detail how these potential arbitrators are to be identified.
Id.
58. Id. at S16.
59. Id. at S14.
60. Id. at S13, S18.
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circumstances that call into question his or her objectivity and
independence. 61 Any party can then challenge an arbitrator to the ICAS
Board.
62
3. Ordinary Division Rules
The Ordinary Division handles the initial cases brought to the CAS;
because of this singular purpose, some of its rules differ from the
Appeals Division, which handles review.
a. Application and Jurisdiction
The CAS Procedural Rules govern any dispute referred by agreement
of the parties to the CAS for resolution. 63 The CAS will resolve any
dispute involving sport-related activity, including pecuniary matters.W
The Ordinary Division hears cases at their initial stage, as opposed to
appeals from previous decisions, including giving advisory opinions.
65
Ordinary Division cases are governed by the General Provisions of the
Procedural Rules and the Special Provisions applicable to Ordinary
Arbitration Procedure. 66  Although it previously appeared that any
USADA case taken directly to the CAS under Supplementary Procedure
Rule 57 would be heard by the Ordinary Division, the 2005 version of
the Supplementary Procedures and USADA protocol negated this
"direct" option.
67
b. Administration
The President of the Ordinary Division is responsible for
administering the division, with some help from the Secretary
68General. The President's duties include ensuring the seamless nature
of the proceedings, ordering provisional measures, and appointing
arbitrators when the parties are unable to agree (on the make-up of the
arbitration panel). 69 The Secretary General reviews all awards before
they become final to make "rectifications of pure form" and potentially
61. Id. at R33.
62. Id. at R34.
63. Id. at R27.
64. Id.
65. Id. at S20.
66. Id. at R38-46.
67. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-57.
68. Of course, the administration of individual hearings is primarily in the hands of each
panel, with a supervisory role for the President of the panel.
69. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S20, R37, and R40. 1. The President of the Division can order
provisional measures until the case file has been transferred to the panel. Then the panel is
empowered to order provisional measures. Id. at R37.
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draw the panel's attention to fundamental issues of principle.
70
c. Pre-Hearing Procedures
The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration ("the Code") does not call for
pre-hearing conferences and meetings as the AAA-CAS and
Supplementary Procedures do. However, the parties can submit
requests for provisional measures to the President before the panel is
confirmed.7 1 When such a request is made, except in the case of
extreme emergencies, the responding party is given ten days to offer
counter arguments.72  Then, in making a provisional request, the
requesting party is considered to have waived the right to request relief
from a state authority.
73
In addition to provisional measures, in a further nod to pre-hearing
procedures, the Code permits the parties to request an order for the
production of documents and the examination of witnesses from the
panel.74 It is not clear from the Code text, however, whether such
requests may be made before the commencement of the hearing, in the
manner of pre-trial discovery, or simply during the hearing process.
75
Besides these allowances, there does not appear to be much in the way
of pre-hearing discovery available to the parties.
d. Hearing Process
The hearing process begins with written submissions from both sides.
The applicant's initial submission must include a statement of the claim,
any written evidence to be submitted, and a list of witnesses and experts
76intended to be called. The respondent's initial submission must
include a response to the claim, written evidence, and a witness and
expert list.77 The applicant is then allowed a reply and the respondent a
second response.78  After all of the written submissions have been
70. Id. at R46. The scope of the Secretary General's power to review decisions does not read
clearly, rather in a possibly open-ended way. Rule 46 could be read as stating that a decision
does not become final until the Secretary General has approved the decision, including the power
to force changes to the decision on matters of fundamental issues of principle.
71. Id. at R37.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. ld. at R44.3.
75. Rule 44.3 states that the panel may address orders at "any time," which suggests that the
order can be made before the hearing has begun. Id. However, Rule 44.3 is a subpart of Rule 44,
which is dedicated to the hearing process as opposed to a pre-hearing process. Id.
76. Id. at R44.1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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proffered, the panel, after consulting with the parties, may hold an oral
hearing.
79
In the case of a hearing, the panel president oversees and is
particularly responsible for ensuring that the statements are concise and
relevant to the written submissions. 8° Witnesses are "invited" to tell the
truth under the sanction of perjury and the panel may exclude witnesses
for irrelevance.8 1 Additionally, the hearings are closed and the awards
private unless the parties agree otherwise. 82  Considering the limited
structural extent regarding hearings in the Code, it is evident that the
President and Panel have a great deal of discretion over the operation of
hearings.
The Code does not contain a specific reference to the evidentiary rule
that will apply during a hearing, aside from the obligations of the
President of the panel to ensure that statements be concise and
relevant.83  The Code does, however, specifically speak to the
production of evidence prior to the hearing. Parties may request that the
panel order the production of documents, if the requesting party can
demonstrate that the documents exist and are relevant. 84 Further, the
panel may order, on its own motion and for its own needs, the
production of documents, witnesses, and experts.
85
The substantive law that governs the dispute will be the law chosen
by the parties, and includes the equitable principle ex aequo et bono.
Failing an agreement between the parties, Swiss law will be used.86
Panel decisions are to be achieved by majority vote, or if a majority
cannot be obtained, then by the President of the panel.87
The award is to be written and briefly state the panels' reasoning,
unless the parties agree otherwise. 88 An award is not final, however,
until the CAS Secretary General has reviewed the decision and has
79. Id. at R44.2, 44.1.
80. Id. at R44.2.
81. Id. at R44.2. The Code does not elaborate as to how the penalty of perjury will be pursued
or enforced.
82. Id. at R44.2, 43.
83. Id. at R44.2.
84. Id. at R44.3. The requirement that the party prove relevancy prior to the production of the
document follows the continental view of discovery rather than the United States' view, which
allows production of evidence that may lead to admissible evidence.
85. Id.
86. Id. at R45.
87. Id. at R46.
88. Id. While the decision must be brief, perhaps following in the civil law tradition, it cannot
be too brief in order to allow the Secretary General to review the decision for fundamental issues
of principle.
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called the Panel's attention to any fundamental issues of principle
overlooked by the Panel.89
e. Appeals Division
In cases where there is an appeal, matters are shifted from a sports
body or the Ordinary Division to the Appeals Division.
i. Jurisdiction and Administration
The Appeals Division has jurisdiction and the Appeals Division's
procedural rules apply when an appeal is taken from a sports body's
decision, provided that the sports body's rules permit such an appeal
and all other remedies have been exhausted. 9° The Appeals Division
also has jurisdiction if the parties specifically agree to its jurisdiction.9 1
An appeal must be made within twenty-one days of the lower decision
to trigger the Appeals Division's jurisdiction.92
Oversight and administration of Appeals Division cases is handled by
the Appeals Division's President.93  The Division President is given
specific power to combine appeals that contain the same issues and
oversee the appointment of the arbitrators.
94
ii. Hearing Process
As an appellate tribunal, the Appeals Division needs few pre-hearing
procedures. However, the applicant, in the statement of appeal, ma
request a stay of the decision originally rendered by the sports body.
Apparently, this kind of a request is decided by the Appeals Division
President without further proceedings. 9
6
The hearing process, which must be completed (completion is
indicated by the publishing of the panel's written decision) within four
months of the filing of the statement of appeal, is initiated with the
applicant's brief. The brief must include a statement of the facts, legal
89. Id. The extent of the Secretary General's power to force a change in the award is unclear
from Rule 46.
90. See id. at R47 (providing for an appeal against the decision of a federation, association, or
sports-related body, as well as against the CAS acting as a first instance tribunal).
91. Id.
92. Id. at R49.
93. Id. at R49-56 (containing provisions that give the President powers such as the power to
form a panel in the absence of an agreement and the power to authorize direct examination of
parties, witnesses, and experts).
94. Id. at R53, R54.
95. Id. at R48.
96. Id. The rule does not provide for a hearing. Id. Therefore, the only logical conclusion is
that no other formalities are required before the President can grant the stay.
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arguments, all exhibits and evidence, a list of all witnesses and experts
that the applicant intends to call at the hearing, any witness statements,
and any request for "other evidentiary measures." 97 The respondent
must then submit an answer that includes the items required in the
applicant's brief, plus any counterclaims.98 The breadth and detail of
the two briefs should be comprehensive when compared with a
traditional appellate brief, because the Appeals Divisions hears the case
de novo. Thus, the panel has full power to review both the facts and
law and to either issue a new decision or refer the case back to the
original sports body for reconsideration.
99
The applicable substantive law governing the hearing is the law
chosen by the parties, which in most cases will be the rules of the sports
body.100 When the parties have not agreed on the substantive law, the
law of the country of the sports body's domicile will be used. 10 1
Regardless of the law that governs the appeal, a panel may use general
rules of law it deems appropriate and necessary to help interpret IF rules
and fill gaps in those rules. 10 2 Panels must then explain why it was
necessary to use such rules to supplement the chosen law and rules.
10 3
The hearing itself is controlled by the Panel President, who directs
the examination of witnesses and any oral argument.104 The decision of
the panel is to be taken by majority vote and in the failure of a majority,
taken by the President of the Panel. 10 5 The decision is to be written and
made public unless the parties agree otherwise. 106 However, as stated
above, the decision is not final until the CAS Secretary General has
reviewed the decision and drawn the panel's attention to fundamental
issues of principle.
10 7
4. AAA-North American Rules
Cases initiated by the USADA are procedurally governed by the
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ("Commercial
97. Id. at R51. Although the rule does not explicitly define "other evidentiary measures," this
open-ended language seems to indicate a general policy of providing wide latitude to the
arbitrators in the process.
98. Id. at R55.
99. Id.
100. Id. at R58.
101. Id.
102. Id. at R58.
103. Id.
104. Id. at R57.
105. Id. at R59.
106. Id.
107. Id. at R59.
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Rules") of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") as modified
by the Supplementary Procedures for Arbitration of Olympic Sport
Doping Disputes (formerly Supplementary Procedures). 108  In most
instances, the provisions of the Commercial Rules have been replaced
by the Supplementary Procedures to the point that the Commercial
Rules play virtually no role in governing the arbitration. The resulting
combination or synthesis of the procedural rules can be divided, for the
purposes of analysis, into the categories of: (1) application andjurisdiction; (2) administration; (3) pre-hearing procedures; (4) hearing
procedures; and (5) post-hearing and appeal. The rules governing the
composition and selection of panel members will be covered in the
Section below.
a. Application and Jurisdiction
Both the Commercial Rules and the Supplementary Procedures apply
to cases that arise out of the USADA's Protocol for Olympic Movement
Testing. 10 9  Once an athlete has tested positive for a prohibited
substance, the USADA Review Board review has been completed, and
the USADA has consequently decided to prosecute an athlete, then the
Commercial-Supplementary Procedure Rules will apply."l 0 Although
proceedings under the Supplementary Procedures are initiated when the
USADA serves notice on the athlete, it appears, though not explicitly
stated in the Supplementary Procedures, that the Supplemental
Procedures do not apply to the USADA Review Board process. 111
108. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-1.
109. Id.
110. UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING
at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/what/protocol/pdf [hereinafter USADA PROTOCOL]
(effective as of Aug. 13, 2004). Under the United States Anti-Doping Agency's Protocol, once
an athlete's A-sample has tested positive for a prohibited substance, a specific set of procedures is
initiated. Id. at § 8. First, the athlete is notified of the positive result, and is notified of his right
to be present with a witness at the testing of a B-sample. Id. at § 8(b). He is also supplied with
laboratory documents from the A-sample testing process. Id. If the B-sample test is positive,
USADA's Anti-Doping Review Board reviews the test result and any documentary evidence
submitted by the athlete to determine if there is sufficient evidence of doping to justify a hearing.
Id. If the Review Board finds sufficient evidence USADA may, in its discretion, charge the
athlete with a doping offense. Id. at §§ 8-9; see also Straubel, supra note 7, at 563-64 (outlining
the USADA's procedure for taking two samples from athletes).
111. USADA notifies an athlete that his or her A-sample tested positive. USADA PROTOCOL,
supra note 110, at § 8. This notification may be considered the notification which triggers the
application of the Supplementary Procedures under Rule 4; however, this is likely not the case.
Rule 1 reads that "these Supplementary Procedures shall apply to arbitrations." AAA-CAS
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-1. Rule 4 reads that "Arbitration
proceedings shall be initiated by USADA by sending a notice to the athlete .. " Id. at R-4.
Thus, Rule 1 and Rule 4, read alone, could be interpreted to say that the Supplementary
Procedures apply to section 8(b) notification of the A-positive test results. See USADA
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Therefore, it appears that two separate notifications of the athlete are
contemplated. The first notification occurs when an athlete's A-sample
has tested positive but before the B-sample is tested. The second notice
occurs after the review board process has been completed and the
USADA has made the administrative decision to prosecute the
athlete.112 After the AAA-CAS hearing, the athlete may choose to have
the matter decided by a CAS Appeals Panel. The CAS appeal hearing,
despite taking place in the United States, is administered by the CAS's
Lausanne Office, using the CAS Appeals Division rules.
113
b. Administration
According to the Supplementary Procedures, doping cases are
administered by the AAA through an AAA Vice-President, who is also
the Secretary for the North American, Central American, and Caribbean
Islands decentralized office of the CAS. 114 However, it appears that in
practice USADA doping cases are administered by the AAA's case
PROTOCOL, supra note 110, at § 8(b) (detailing the procedures by which the USADA notifies an
athlete of the test results). But section 9(a)(i)(5) of the USADA Protocol reads "the process
before the Review Board shall not be considered a 'hearing."' Id. at § 9(b)(v). If an arbitration is
considered a hearing, then the first notice does not trigger the application of the Supplementary
Procedures.
112. USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 110, at § 9. It could be argued that the first notice is
notice of an administrative process that does not trigger procedural protections, and that the
second notice is notice of an adjudicative process that does involve and trigger procedural
protections.
113. Many questions remain about CAS-administered arbitrations held in the U.S. as is
permitted by Rule 49A. The first question is whether the arbitration would be considered an
initial arbitration and governed by the rules of the Ordinary Arbitration Division, or whether it
would be considered an appeal and governed by the rules of the Appeals Division. The second
question is-since the hearing must be held in the United States-whether Swiss or United States
public law and choice of law rules would apply. For example, while Rule 57 states that the CAS
decision "shall be final and binding and shall not be subject to further review or appeal except as
permitted by the Swiss Federal Judicial Organization Act or the Swiss Statute on Private
International Law," because the hearing is being held in the United States, it might also be
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R57. Application of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") would occur under the following reasoning. First, the Act
applies to "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Second, the term "involving commerce"
has been equated to Congress's power to regulate under the commerce clause. See Snyder v.
Smith, 736 F. 2d 409, 418 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting the "involving commerce" requirement
not as a limitation but a qualification suggesting that Congress intended the FAA to apply to all
contracts that it constitutionally could regulate), overruled on other grounds by Felen v. Andreas,
134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.1998). Finally, the Supreme Court found, in Flood v. Kuhn, that
professional baseball is a business which engages in interstate commerce. Therefore, if Olympic
Movement sports are considered now similar to professional baseball, the arbitration of disputes
arising out of Olympic Movement sports involves interstate commerce and is therefore
"commercial." Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972).
114. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-2.
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management office. 1 15Thus, the Secretary of the North American
decentralized CAS serves primarily as a communication link between
the AAA and the CAS's Lausanne Office.
c. Pre-Hearing Procedures
Pre-hearing procedures are the same under the Commercial Rules and
the Supplementary Procedures, and fall into two categories: (1) pre-
panel selection; and (2) post-panel selection. Before the arbitrator(s)
have been selected, the AAA, at the request of the parties or at the
AAA's initiative, can hold an administrative conference. 116  The
conference is conducted by the AAA, and may address any
administrative matter including arbitrator selection and discovery. Once
the arbitrator(s) are selected, control of the proceedings shifts from the
AAA to the panel of arbitrators.
After establishment of the panel, the parties, arbitrators, or AAA can
request a preliminary hearing. 117 At the preliminary hearing the parties
discuss the scheduling of the rest of the process and the narrowing of
the issues. 118 At this stage the arbitrators may order interim measures,
including injunctive relief and discovery requests. 1 9 The parties may
request the production of documents, the identity of witnesses to be
called, and any other pertinent information. 120
d. The Hearing
After the 2004 amendments to the Supplementary Procedures there is
no longer a time limit for completing the arbitration process, only
interim limits within the process. The arbitrators, however, are given
the authority to shorten the time limits as necessity dictates, particularly
in the case of protected competitions. 12 1  Further, even though the
115. E-mail from Mr. Brian Winn, District Vice President for the AAA, Atlanta Regional
Office, to Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University (June 16, 2004,
13:26:36 CST) (on file with author).
116. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-10; AMER.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R9
(July 1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES], available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
117. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-22; AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R20.
118. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-22; AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R20.
119. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-36; AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R34.
120. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-23; AAA COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R21.
121. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-24. Protected
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standard order of proof presentation is called for, 12 2 the arbitrators have
the authority to alter the proceeding as needed, provided that the parties
are treated equally and each party is given a fair opportunity to present
its case. 123 In other words, arbitrators have a large degree of autonomy
to manage and control each particular hearing process as they see fit, as
long as basic notions of due process are followed.
124
During the hearing, the substantive rules governing the question of
whether a doping offense has occurred is now governed by the World
Anti-Doping Code. Should the World Anti-Doping Code not address an
issue, the USADA Protocol, USOC National Anti-Doping Policy, and
applicable IF rules will be used. 125 Prior to their amendment in 2005,
the Supplementary Procedures specifically allowed for the mitigation of
the Anti-Doping Code and IF rules by the principles of CAS precedent.
The reason for this change is unknown. Further, neither the
Commercial Rules nor the Supplementary Procedures provide for a
method of selecting a fall-back body of national substantive law, a
contingency the rules of the European CAS do provide for. 126 Thus, in
a case where a back-up substantive law is needed, it must be asked
whether the process provided in the European CAS's rules will be
used-or should be used-in order to create uniformity and
predictability in the Global CAS system.
127
During a hearing, standard rules of evidence need not be followed.
128
Nevertheless, to be admitted, evidence must be relevant and material.
129
Additionally, the arbitrators are required to recognize legal privileges
and may subpoena witnesses when necessary. 13  While the World Anti-
competitions are the most important events and include the Olympic and Pan American Games.
122. Supplementary Procedures Rule 32 states that the claimant, USADA, shall first present
its case, and then the respondent, the athlete, shall present his or her case. AAA-CAS
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-32. Beyond those simple guidelines, there
are no dictates as to the conduct of the hearing. The process is left to the discretion of the
arbitrators. Id.
123. Id.
124. Though not due process in the Constitutional sense, as interpreted by attorneys in the
United States attorneys, the requirement of a fair hearing will undoubtedly be viewed as a
minimal level of procedural due process.
125. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-33(e).
126. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R45 (stating that Swiss law will apply if the parties did
not choose a law to govern); id. at R58 (stating that, on appeal, the panel should apply the law
chosen by the parties, or, in the absence of this choice, the country law where the sports body is
domiciled, or according to laws that the panel deems appropriate).
127. If precedent is to be used and serve as a stabilizing tool, then one source of substantive
law should also be used if consistency is to be achieved.
128. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-33(a).
129. Id. at R33(a), (b).
130. Id. at R33(c), (d).
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Doping Code establishes the ultimate burden of proving a doping
offense, 131 the Supplementary Procedures establish a very important
presumption and accompanying burden of proof: that the transportation,
custody, and testing of an athlete's sample is presumed to be done
properly and according to prevailing scientific standards. 132 To rebut
the presumption, an accused athlete need only submit counter-evidence
to remove the presumption and have the USADA charged with the
burden of proving proper custody and reliable testing by clear and
convincing evidence.1l °  It is uncertain, however, whether the
USADA's burden on the question of sample testing will be to show that
the testing process itself was properly carried out, or whether the
proscribed process does in fact itself produce reliable results. 134
Hearings are to be private, with only concerned parties allowed to
attend, unless the arbitrators decide otherwise. 135 Concerned parties can
include the applicable IF's representatives, at the IF's election. 136 At
the conclusion of the hearing process, the arbitrators must reach a
decision by a majority vote. Additionally, the Supplementary Rules-
as opposed to the Commercial Rules-then require a written, reasoned
decision. 137
e. Post Hearing and Appeal
Because the AAA-CAS proceedings are initial hearings, decisions
can be appealed to the European CAS. 138  However, that appellate
hearing must be held in the United States,139 which raises interesting
questions of the law that might govern the hearing. 140  Finally,
131. Id. at R33(e). See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE §
3.1 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http:/lwww.cces.ca/pdfs/wada-wadc-Final-E.pdf (last visited
Apr. 23, 2005) [hereinafter WADA CODE] (establishing that the standard of proof will be
whether the organization has established a violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
body).
132. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-33(e).
133. Id.
134. The reliability of the testing procedure has been challenged in several CAS cases. See
infra Part III.E.2 (noting several CAS cases where the reliability of the testing procedure has been
challenged).
135. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-25.
136. Id. at R-4.
137. Id. at R-44. But see AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at
R42(b) (providing that the arbitrator does not need to render a reasoned award unless one is
requested in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitrator deems one necessary).
138. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-49.
139. Id.
140. When the hearing is physically held within the United States, public laws, such as the
Federal Arbitration Act, could apply under the territorial principle of jurisdiction.
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according to Rule 49(a) of the Supplementary Procedures, the decision
of the European CAS is final and may only be challenged as is
permitted by the Swiss Federal Judicial Organization Act or the Swiss
Statute on Private International Law. 14 r  However, the Federal
Arbitration Act may be applicable despite the limitations contained in
Rule 49(A). 142
III. QUESTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND CONSISTENCY
The CAS, and later AAA-CAS, were spawned from commercial
dispute models. 143  However, both of these bodies are now being
forced-because of the burgeoning questions surrounding drug use in
international sport-into deciding disputes that are decidedly un-
commercial in nature. In fact, these doping allegations, regardless of
whether they are quasi-criminal in nature, or breach of contract in
nature, are accusatory and therefore require a heightened level of
fairness, apparent to all parties.
There are five areas in which the CAS and the AAA-CAS, because of
this change in focus, need to address questions and concerns about their
methods and the appearance of fairness: (1) in the selection of
arbitrators to hear the cases; (2) CAS independence from the governing
bodies of the Olympic Movement; (3) the choice of substantive law
used in each case; (4) the development and use of precedent; and (5) the
development and consistent use of key legal doctrines. In looking at
these five areas of concern, it can be seen that the effort to create a
unified international adjudication system has encountered bumps along
the way. These bumps will be identified and then addressed with
suggestions for the coming challenges in the future of international
sport arbitration.
A. The Arbitrator Selection Process
The process of creating a master list of arbitrators has proven to be a
very important question to the legitimacy of the CAS, and thus subject
to litigation in the national courts of Switzerland and the United
States.144 Thus, the process and the litigation it has spawned must be
141. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R49(A).
142. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (suggesting that the FAA may be applicable
because it applies to arbitration of a contract "involving commerce" and interpreting this phrase
to include professional sports).
143. See supra Part I1 (describing the origins of CAS and AAA-CAS).
144. For examples involving athletes and the use of arbitration under the CAS, see Jacobs v.
USA Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2004); A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed.
Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of 27 May 2003, translation available at
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examined very closely in any appraisal of the CAS's legitimacy and
potential to handle doping cases.
1. CAS Selection
The first step in the process of creating a CAS arbitration panel is the
formulation of a master list of arbitrators from which to choose. 145
Then, from this list, arbitrators must be selected for both ordinary
division and appellate division matters. 14
6
a. Creating the Master List
The lists of potential arbitrators for both the Ordinary and Appeals
divisions are created by the ICAS.147 However, while the ICAS selects
the arbitrators for the master list, three-fifths of that list consists of
arbitrators first nominated by the IOC, IFs, and NOCs. 148  The
remaining two-fifths are to be, in equal parts, selected with an eye
toward protecting the interests of athletes and to be independent from
the IOC, IFs, and NOCs. 14 9 Further, the master list of arbitrators shall
be a fair representation of the continents and different judicial cultures
of the world. 150  Each arbitrator must be legally trained, possess
recognized competence in sports law or international arbitration, be
knowledgeable of sports in general, and have a command of either
French or English. 15  Each arbitrator serves a renewable four-year term
on the master list and takes an oath to be objective and independent. 152
Finally, each arbitrator must disclose any circumstances that call into
question his or her objectivity and independence.153 Any party can then
challenge an arbitrator, and the challenge will be decided by the ICAS
Board. 154
http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
145. See infra Part llI.A.l.a (describing the process of selecting arbitrators for a master list).
146. See infra Part m.A.l.b.i-ii (explaining the selection process).
147. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S6, 14.
148. Id. at S14. One-fifth of the list of CAS arbitrators shall be selected from persons
nominated by the IOC, another one-fifth from a list nominated by the IFs, and another one-fifth
from a list nominated by the NOCs. Id.
149. Id. One-fifth of the list of arbitrators are to be appointed with the view of safeguarding
the interests of athletes and another one-fifth of the list is to be persons independent of the IOC,
IFs, and NOC. However, the Code does not detail how these potential arbitrators are to be
identified. See id. (outlining who will make the list of potential arbitrators without clarifying how
they are picked).
150. Id. at S16.
151. Id. at S14.
152. Id. at S13, 18.
153. Id. at S33.
154. Id. at R34.
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b. Selecting Panel Members
Since the process for selecting panel members differs between the
Ordinary and Appeals divisions, it is necessary to break up the
processes into two separate Sections.
i. Ordinary Division
An Ordinary Division case is heard by either a single arbitrator or a
panel of three arbitrators, as agreed to by the parties. 155  Failing an
agreement, the choice of single arbitrator or panel is determined by the
President of the Division. 156 The method of selecting the arbitrator(s) is
also done according to the agreement of the parties. 157 In the absence
of an agreement, if a single arbitrator is to be used, the President shall
make the appointment. 158 If a panel of three is to be used, each party
selects one arbitrator and the third arbitrator is selected by agreement of
the appointed arbitrators. 159 In the case of more than two parties, the
applicants and the respondents jointly appoint an arbitrator for each side
to the panel, and the two appointed arbitrators select the third
arbitrator. 160 If the three parties have divergent interests, and in the
absence of an agreement selecting the arbitrators, the President appoints
all three arbitrators. 161 Finally, arbitrators are only considered officially
appointed after the President of the Division has confirmed their
appointment. In the confirmation process the President is to confirm
that the arbitrators are independent as required by Code Rule 33.162
Unfortunately, the Code is silent on the extent of the President's power
to block appointment at this stage.
163
ii. Appeals Division
The Code expresses a preference that appeals be heard by a panel of
three arbitrators unless the parties agree on a single arbitrator at the
outset, or alternatively if the President of the Division deems the appeal
155. Id. at R40.1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. atR41.1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at R40.3.
163. Id. R40.3 does not specify if the President may veto or reject the appointment of an
arbitrator that does not meet the requirements of R33. Id. This power may be implied, otherwise
the requirement would be a nullity. However, the Code gives exclusive right to disqualify
arbitrators to the ICAS Board in R34. Id. at R34.
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to be an emergency case that should be heard by a sole arbitrator.164 If
the appeal is to be heard by a single arbitrator, the arbitrator is
appointed by the Division President. 165 On the other hand, if a panel is
to hear the appeal, the applicant nominates an arbitrator in the statement
of the appeal, and the respondent nominates an arbitrator within ten
days of receiving the statement of appeal, 166 and the Division President
names the President of the panel after consulting with the party
appointed arbitrators. 16 7  All nominations become final only after the
Division President confirms that each arbitrator is independent of the
parties. 1
68
2. North American CAS
The recent amendments to the Supplementary Procedures seem to
have addressed some of the concerns about the rules for selecting
arbitrators for AAA-CAS panels. However, concerns about the creation
of the master list, which ultimately leads to the panels, remain.
a. Creating the Master List
The arbitrator or arbitrators that will hear a USADA claim (or
prosecution) are chosen from a combined roster composed of both AAA
and CAS arbitrators. 169  In some cases, the parties may agree to have
appointed an arbitrator who is not on the AAA-CAS roster. 1 7  In order
to be named to the AAA-CAS Master list, the arbitrator must be
approved by ICAS. 171 The arbitrator then appears on both the CAS and
164. Id. at R50.
165. Id. at R54.
166. Id. at R48, 53.
167. Id. at R54.
168. Id at R33, 54.
169. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-3. Also, arbitrators
appointed to hear disputes brought under the AAA Commercial Rules, unless otherwise agreed,
are drawn from an AAA created roster. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
116, atR3, 11.
170. While both the AAA Commercial Rules and Supplementary Procedures do not explicitly
permit the parties to name arbitrators not on the national rosters, Rule 12 of the Commercial
Rules states that when the parties agree on an arbitrator or a method to select an arbitrator, that
agreement will be honored. Rule 12 goes on to require that the name and address of the arbitrator
be sent to the AAA. The provisions of Rule 12 imply that the parties will name arbitrators
unknown to the AAA. However, Rule 3 of the Supplementary Procedures reads that "[t]he Panel
of Arbitrators for doping cases shall consist of the North American Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) Arbitrators who shall also be AAA Arbitrators." But the title of Rule 3 is "National Pool
of Arbitrators." This may all be academic however, because athletes are unlikely to ask USADA
before testing positive to agree to a non-AAA-CAS arbitrator and USADA is unlike to agree to a
non AAA-CAS arbitrator.
171. Although the Supplementary Procedures do not specifically state that ICAS must
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AAA-CAS master list. The details of who nominates the AAA
arbitrators to the ICAS are not covered in the Code or Supplementary
Procedures, however, and inquiries of AAA and CAS officials have
produced incomplete and conflicting answers.
172
b. Selecting Panel Members
Prior to the 2005 amendments to the Supplementary Procedures, the
parties were free to agree on their own process for selecting arbitrators
and failing such an agreement the Procedures called for a selection
process that involved significant AAA involvement and discretion.
173
Now, after the 2005 amendments to the Procedures, the selection
process is carefully proscribed and the role of the AAA is reduced.
The new selection process begins with the AAA sending a list of all
the AAA-CAS arbitrators to the accused athlete and to the USADA.
174
A single arbitrator is to be chosen unless either party notifies the AAA
within five days of its desire for a three arbitrator panel. 175 If a single
arbitrator is chosen, the parties are first encouraged to agree upon that
particular arbitrator. 176 Failing an agreement, each party is to strike up
to one-third of the arbitrators from the list provided by the AAA and
rank the remaining arbitrators. 177  The parties are then invited to
"accept" or agree upon a mutually acceptable arbitrator from the
combined preference list provided by the AAA. 178  If a mutually
acceptable arbitrator cannot be found, the AAA will appoint the
approve AAA-CAS arbitrators appointed to the master list, ICAS must approve all arbitrators
appointed to the CAS master list. See supra Part III.A. L.a (detailing creation of the CAS master
list).
172. North American-CAS Regional Secretary Jennifer Coffman did not know how AAA-
CAS arbitrators were nominated. E-mail from Jennifer Coffman, Regional Secretary, North
American-Comm'l Arbitration for Sport, to Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor of Law,
Valparaiso University School of Law (June 7, 2004) (on file with author). AAA Vice-President
Brian Winn believed that the USOC and USADA nominated the arbitrators to ICAS. E-mail
response from Brian Winn, Vice President, AAA, to Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor of
Law, Valparaiso University School of Law (June 8, 2004) (on file with author). Requests to
USOC General Counsel Jeffrey Benz and USADA General Counsel Travis Taggart have gone
unanswered to date.
173. See AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R12 (discussing the
powers of the AAA). For example, under the 2000 Supplementary Prodedures the AAA chooses
the ten arbitrators that the parties were allowed to select their "party-appointed" arbitrator from.
Under the 2005 Supplementary Procedures the parties are permitted to select their "party-
appointed" arbitrator from the entire master list of AAA-CAS arbitrators.
174. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-13(a).
175. Id. at R-13(b).
176. Id. at R-13(c).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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arbitrator from the remaining members of the panel. 179
If the parties elect to use a three arbitrator panel, USADA first selects
and notifies the AAA of its chosen arbitrator. The AAA then notifies
the athlete of the USADA selection, after which the athlete has five
days to make his or her selection. 180  The third arbitrator, and
henceforth president of the panel, is selected by an agreement between
the two chosen arbitrators. 18 1  Should the appointed arbitrators be
unable to agree, then the aforementioned process of selecting a single
arbitrator is used.1
82
All arbitrators selected to a panel, both the "part-appointed"
arbitrators and the panel chair, are expected to be neutral. 8  Ensuring
this fair-mindedness, both the party-appointed arbitrator and the panel
chair can be disqualified for circumstances indicating a lack of
impartiality or independence. 184  This includes "any financial or
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present
relationship with the parties or their representatives." '  The AAA
serves as the judge of whether an arbitrator shall be disqualified. 186
However, due to the use of anachronistic labels and uncorrected
overlaps between the Supplementary Procedures and the Commercial
Rules, only the panel chair is required to disclose circumstances
affecting their neutrality. Further, the parties may only request the
disqualification of a panel chair, not the other party-appointed
arbitrator. 187  In the Commercial Rules and then the Supplementar
Procedures, the panel chair is referred to as the "neutral arbitrator."1l 8
Although all of the arbitrators are mandated to be neutral, this title is
used for the panel chair because, unlike the party-appointed arbitrators
who can communicate with the parties during the hearing, the panel
chair has no contact with the parties and was not selected by the
179. Id. at R-13(c).
180. Id. at R-13(d)(i).
181. Id. at R-13(d)(ii).
182. Id.
183. Id. at R-12.
184. Id. at R-19.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 2005 Supplementary Procedure Rule 19 permits the parties to object to the service of the
"neutral" arbitrator. Rule 12 states that party-appointed arbitrators may be disqualified for the
reasons listed in Rule 19 but there is no express statement in the rules permitting the parties to
object to the service of a party-appointed arbitrator. Id. at R-12, -19.
188. Id. at R-12, -19, -20; AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 116, at R12,
13, 16, 17, 18.
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parties. 189
B. Independence From Governing Bodies
One of the major challenges to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
CAS and AAA-CAS have been doubts about their independence.
Questions of independence have been raised about the organizations'
relative autonomy from the governing bodies of the Olympic Movement
and about the independence of individual arbitrators within the
organizations. Three specific situations raise doubts about
independence: (1) the operation of CAS and AAA-CAS; (2) the creation
of the master list of arbitrators; and (3) the appointment of an individual
arbitrator to hearing panels. These separate concerns will be raised in
turn with the second two combined into a single category on arbitrator
independence. 190
1. CAS-Lausanne Independence
In order to keep their concerns separate and more easily understood,
this Section, like the one before, will first examine the CAS in
Lausanne, and then the North American-CAS. First, this Section will
look at the institutional independence of the entire organization, and
then the specific independence of the arbitrators and how the selection
process potentially affects their level of independence. 1
91
a. Institutional Independence
The independence of the CAS, as an institution, from the IOC and the
rest of the bodies of the Olympic Movement was a concern early in the
history of the CAS and remains-although at a much reduced level-a
continuing concern. The foundation of this concern is the CAS's birth
from the IOC and enduring dependence on the IOC and other Olympic
Movement institutions for its funding. 19 2 The fear is that at a minimum,
the CAS will see the IOC and other governing bodies as its constituency
and feel the need, however subtle, to please that constituency. This
concern was perhaps most importantly expressed by the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court in a 1993 judgment.'9 3  As a direct result of that
189. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 116, at R-18.
190. See infra Parts Il.B.1-2 (commenting on the challenges and concerns raised by certain
areas of CAS independence, or lack thereof).
191. See infra Part lII.B.1.a-b (examining CAS independence).
192. See supra Part II.A. 1 (detailing the genesis of CAS and its financial backing).
193. See supra Part lI.A.2 (describing the Gundel case and its effects on CAS). The Gundel
case was a public law appeal of a CAS decision (CAS 92/63 G. v. FEI) to the Swiss Federal
Tribunal, decided March 15, 1993, published in OFFICIAL DIGEST OF FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
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judgment, the CAS was restructured. 194
In order to address concerns about its institutional autonomy, the
CAS has taken two main steps. One was to create the ICAS and the
other was to diversify its funding. The ICAS was created in order to
serve as a buffer between the IOC and sports establishment in the
arbitration process. 195 It consists of twenty members, four appointed by
the IOC, four appointed by the International Federations, four appointed
by National Olympic Committees, four selected by the twelve
previously appointed members with an eye toward protecting the
interest of athletes, and four selected by the already appointed members
intended to be independent of the governing bodies of the Olympic
Movement. 196 ICAS functions include amending the Code, electing the
President of each CAS Division, appointing arbitrators to the master
list, hearing challenges on the independence of arbitrators, and
approving the CAS budget. 197  Second, to diversify its funding, the
CAS now receives one-third of its funding from the IOC, one-third from
the International Federations, and one-third from the National Olympic
Committees. 198
The first step in determining whether the ICAS and the new funding
system adequately protect the CAS's independence is to identify the
appropriate standard. While many standards would be appropriate, the
most appropriate is that found in Swiss law. 199 This standard has been
applied by the Swiss Federal Tribunal to the CAS in cases challenging
the CAS's independence from the IOC. 200 The Swiss standard looks for
JUDGMENTS II, 119, 271.
194. See COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II, 1998-2000 xxv-
xxvi (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (highlighting the role of Gundel in bringing about organizational
reform at CAS); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the organizational changes that followed the 1993
challenge to CAS independence).
195. The ICAS statute specifically states that its purpose is to "safeguard the independence of
the CAS... " CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S2.
196. Id. at S4.
197. Id. at S6.
198. See Agreement concerning the constitution of the International Council of Arbitration for
Sport (Paris Agreement), art. 3, reprinted in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 884
(Mattieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (setting forth the proportion of funding from various entities).
199. Although CAS operates on the international level, hearing cases between citizens of
different countries and sometimes applying different national law, it has declared Switzerland to
be its "seat" and thereby choosen Swiss law to govern its operation. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of Swiss law to all CAS arbitrations, regardless of
where the arbitrations are physically held). Further, Switzerland has become the de facto
homeland of the Olympic Movement and the IOC, since a good number of IFs are headquartered
there and Swiss law is the de facto law of the Olympic Movement.
200. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003, translation available at http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last
1230 [Vol. 36
2005] Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court
"circumstances [that would] produce the appearance of prejudice and
cast doubt over [a] judge's impartiality." 20 1
Before applying that standard, however, it should be noted that the
question of CAS independence becomes more important, and therefore
scrutinized more carefully, when the case before the CAS involves an
accusation of wrongdoing by an athlete. Such a case pits an institution
of the Olympic Movement, in a prosecutorial posture, against an
individual athlete. Thus, the relative power relationship between the
two parties creates a strong need for CAS to be independent.
In 2001, the Swiss Federal Tribunal addressed the question of CAS
independence from the IOC and concluded that the CAS was
sufficiently independent from the IOC.202  The foundation of the
Court's conclusion was that the creation of the ICAS and the
diversification of funding have sufficiently reduced the IOC's ability to
influence any CAS decision by essentially diluting the IOC's role in
controlling and funding the CAS.203 Before moving on, it must be
stated that the 1994 reforms have gone a long way to ensuring CAS
independence.2 04 But the facts and arguments presented to the Court
failed to frame the issue as it may now exist. That issue may be more
properly phrased as: is the CAS sufficiently independent from the
collective governing bodies of the Olympic Movement? The CAS's
constituency-its benefactors, upon whom it relies for its continued
existence-is now the combination of the IOC, the IFs, the NOCs, and
the NGBs. Those governing bodies collectively share common
interests, particularly vis-A-vis individual athletes. Therefore, the
question has simply been rearranged to ask: does the collective
influence of the Olympic governing bodies on the ICAS and CAS and
the exclusive funding of the CAS by Olympic governing bodies
challenge the independence of the CAS?
Despite the concerns, CAS reforms have insulated it for the most
part. Direct influences-such as those feared by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal before the 1994 reforms-are now highly unlikely. Any
potential influences will be subtle. For example, administrative
decisions, such as the appointment of panel presidents, the review of
decisions for publication and approval, and the approval of executive
position appointments could all be done, however subconsciously, to
visited Apr. 23, 2005).
201. Id. at para. 3.3.3.
202. Id. atpara. 3.3.3.1-4.
203. Id.
204. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the changes instituted in 1994).
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please the constituency that the CAS owes its existence and financial
support to. But, assuming this worst case scenario, does this threat rise
to the level of "circumstances [that would] produce the appearance of
prejudice and cast doubt over [a] judge's impartiality?,, 20 5- Likely not.
Subtle institutional pressures like these are rarely demonstrable and
would not create the objective circumstances sufficient to create
206impartiality. Nevertheless, such subtle pressures can manifest
themselves in a way that, while not outcome determinative in an
individual case, and despite the best of intentions, work-over the long
rn-to affect the outcome of cases. Such subtle effects could cause the
development of doctrine that favors governing bodies, over time
stacking the deck against an athlete, or in cases involving management
decisions.
These subtle influences are inherent to almost all judicial institutions.
But efforts must still be made to minimize their effects. Grand
structural solutions or changes, such as alternative funding for the CAS
could be practically difficult and may not reduce significantly the
existing pressures. The best protections will likely come with day to
day changes in the CAS operating rules, such as the openness of the
arbitrator appointment and selection process and other steps mentioned
below.20 7 One unique solution which would require more analysis, and
is beyond the scope of this Article, is the creation of monitoring groups
comprised of athletes or athletes' attorneys, perhaps akin to a union.
b. Arbitrator Independence
The other main source of questions about CAS autonomy revolves
around the arbitrators that hear CAS disputes, and how much autonomy
they are allowed in the hearings. There are two ways in which CAS
arbitrators can have their autonomy curtailed. First, by creating a finite
list of arbitrators, only certain people will be appointed, and thus
reliance on the body creating the list may be fostered. Second, in order
to become a member of a panel, arbitrators must pass through the tricky
panel selection process, a process that can usurp some of their
independence.
205. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003 at para. 3.3.3; see Gundel v. CAS, Swiss Fed'l Tribunal (Mar. 15, 1993), appeal
from G. v. FEI, CAS 92/63, in OFFICIAL DIGEST OF FED'L TRIBUNAL JUDGMENTS II, 119, 271
(using this as its standard).
206. The Swiss Federal Tribunal requires proof of bias by objective circumstances only. A. &
B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of 27 May 2003 at
para. 3.3.3.
207. See infra Part III.B.2.a-b (recommending changes in the arbitrator selection process to
improve transparency and independence).
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i. Master List Creation
The independence of the CAS arbitration process depends largely on
the initial selection of independent and qualified arbitrators. Under the
provisions of the Code, the CAS maintains a master list of at least 150
arbitrators208 who must be legally trained, possess "competence" in
sports law or international arbitration, and have a good command of
English or French.20 9  Further, the arbitrators should represent the
different continents and judicial cultures of the world.2 10 One-fifth of
the arbitrators on this list are to come from those nominated by the IOC,
one-fifth from those nominated by the IFs, and one-fifth from those
nominated by the NOCs. 211 The fourth one-fifth of the master list is to
be appointed with an eye toward protecting the interest of athletes, and
the final group is required to not be associated with the governing
bodies of the Olympic Movement. 2 12 All arbitrators on the master list
must be approved by ICAS.2 13
Despite the attempt to create a diversified master list of arbitrators, as
is described above, there are concerns that the list either contains too
many-or is dominated by-potentially biased arbitrators. While the
Swiss Federal Tribunal addressed this claim and dismissed it, the
Tribunal focused on the influence of the IOC alone and not the
collective influence of the governing bodies of the Olympic family.
214
The Olympic governing bodies together nominate three-fifths of the
master list. Then, the remaining two-fifths of the arbitrators, though
theoretically from the outside the Olympic Movement, are identified
and approved by an ICAS dominated by members appointed by the
Olympic family. It can be argued therefore that all of the arbitrators
come from, have ties to, or owe their presence on the master list of
arbitrators to the Olympic family. Further, the list can and does include
arbitrators who have and continue to represent parties before the CAS,
including governing bodies, an arrangement that can create a conflict of
interest or the appearance of a lack of independence. Finally, as a
closed list, even though the list consisted at one time of over 180
persons, the selection of experienced and well-qualified arbitrators is
208. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S13.
209. Id. at S14.
210. Id. at S16.
211. Id. at S14.
212. Id.
213. Id. at S6. Interestingly, the composition of the ICAs has the same distribution, as far as
the percentage of nominations allocated to each group, as the master list. Id. at S4.
214. Gundel v. CAS, appealfrom G. v. FEI, CAS 92/63 (Mar. 15, 1993), in OFFIcIAL DIGEST
OF FED'L TRIBUNAL JUDGMENTS II, 119, 271.
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limited to a small group of frequently used arbitrators.
Do these concerns rise to the level of "circumstances [that would]
produce the appearance of prejudice and cast doubt over [a] judge's
impartiality" and can the number of potentially biased arbitrators
populating the master list be reduced? Yes, the inclusion of arbitrators
that continue to represent parties before the CAS does create an
appearance of doubt of impartiality, and there are steps that can be taken
to reduce the number of potentially biased arbitrators. Further, the
impact of the remaining potentially biased arbitrators can be reduced by
expanding the source of arbitrator nominations.
Just as it may be a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for a
judge to hear a case being argued by a government agency that formerly
employed him,215 it creates the appearance of a conflict of interest when
an attorney represents an athlete or a governing body and then serves as
an arbitrator in a disciplinary case. This is particularly so when the
collective interest of the Olympic Movement is then called into question
by an athlete, such as in doping cases.2 16 The easiest way to prevent
this appearance of impropriety is to not appoint arbitrators to the master
list that represent parties, including athletes, before the CAS. This will,
of course, reduce the number of available experienced arbitrators. This
shortage will be temporary, however, 2 17 and CAS arbitrators' resultant
improved legitimacy would be worth the temporary shortage of
experienced arbitrators.
The source of arbitrators should also be expanded in order to balance
out the number of arbitrators nominated by governing bodies. The
current one-fifth division of nominations should be expanded to sixths.
An athletes' union should be added as a source of nominations to the
master list. Adding an athletes' union as a source of nominations would
create a balance of one-half of the nominations coming from governing
215. See IND. CODE ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 & cmt. (West 2003)
(stating that a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned because he was formerly employed by a government agency that
is a party in the case).
216. All governing bodies now have a commonality of interest in doping cases because they
have adopted the World Anti-Doping Code and any interpretation of the Code or precedent could
affect how all governing bodies enforce the World Anti-Doping Code. All of the IFs were forced
to accept the World Anti-Doping Code as a condition of participation in the 2004 Olympics.
217. The growing importance and number of CAS cases will attract more qualified persons to
become arbitrators thus expanding the pool of independent arbitrators. Also, to be a qualified
arbitrator, an arbitrator need not satisfy both of the CAS eligibility criteria: arbitration experience
and sport experience. Arbitration experience is the more important of the two criteria and easily
found. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S14 (requiring qualified arbitrators to have "competence
with regard to sports law and/or international arbitration").
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bodies, and one-half of the nominations coming or representing non-
governing body origins. While adding an athletes' union as a
nominating source may not work to remove potentially biased
arbitrators from the master list, it will at the least create a better
appearance of balance.
218
Alternative solutions, such as an open list of arbitrators or the
addition of arbitrators nominated by an athletes' union, without
excluding arbitrators that have represented parties, likely would not
eliminate the conflicts of interest. An open list would compromise the
quest for using only qualified arbitrators, as well as still allowing the
appointment of arbitrators that represent parties before the CAS.
Expanding the master list to include arbitrators nominated by an
athletes' union would only increase the number of arbitrators that have
represented parties. Perhaps the CAS could prohibit arbitrators from
hearing cases between a governing body and an athlete when the
arbitrator has represented either in the past. But that prohibition might
not clearly announce that the CAS does not tolerate any appearance of a
conflict of interest.
ii. Selection of Panel Members
In both the Ordinary and Appellate Divisions each party is permitted
to name an arbitrator to the panel.219 In Ordinary Division cases the
President or third member of the panel is selected by the two party-
appointed arbitrators. 220 In the Appellate Division the panel President
is appointed by the Division President.221  Permitting the parties to
appoint panel members creates the opportunity for the appointment of
biased or friendly arbitrators. The parties in both Divisions will quite
logically and reasonably appoint arbitrators that they believe are
receptive or friendly to their positions in the case. To do otherwise
would be foolish and possibly even professional malpractice by the
attorney representing a party. This may explain why the same
arbitrators are consistently re-appointed by federation and athletes'
attorneys. 2 22  The result is two arbitrators with directly opposite
218. While creating an athletes' union may be a benefit to Olympic athletes, creating an
international union to counter balance the international presence of the IOC will be difficult for
many reasons. Perhaps the best vehicle for such a counter balance would be a strong athletes'
advisory committee and ombudsman, similar to but even stronger than the once created by the
USOC.
219. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R40.2, 48, 53.
220. Id. at R40.2.
221. Id. at R54.
222. This information is based on interviews with two CAS arbitrators and a review of the
published CAS decisions.
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predispositions and attitudes on the panel. With two votes potentially
predetermined, this leaves the panel President to break the deadlock.
Then, because the panel President plays the critical tie-breaking role, his
appointment becomes, perhaps, the pivotal event in deciding who wins
the case. This increases the importance of the CAS's role and increases
the chance for control of the outcome by CAS.
In an effort to reduce these possible improper influences, arbitrators
are required to complete and sign a declaration of independence in
which they are required to disclose any possible conflicts of interest.223
The Division President then confirms that each panel member is
independent of the parties to the case before the panel can proceed to
hear the case. 224  Finally, the parties can challenge an arbitrator's
independence; this challenge would be heard by the ICAS.225
Does the appointment of friendly arbitrators create circumstances that
produce the appearance of prejudice and cast doubt over a judge's
impartiality? Do these safeguards prevent the appointment of friendly
or biased arbitrators? Because objective circumstances are required to
prove the appearance of prejudice or doubt of an arbitrator's
impartiality, the appointment of friendly arbitrators is likely not enough
to disqualify an arbitrator.226  But that does not remove a serious
problem, and one that seriously challenges the CAS's credibility.
The practice of party-appointed arbitrators is deeply-rooted in the
tradition of arbitration. It is a time-honored practice that is not easily
challenged. But, it was developed primarily for commercial arbitration
involving contract disputes. Many of the cases that the CAS hears do
not fit the commercial arbitration mold. Doping cases and other
disciplinary cases are more akin to a prosecution. Doping cases are
more like a criminal prosecution than like a traditional arbitration case
because there is an accusation of wrongdoing and the remedy is more
than mere compensation. This distinction may be best demonstrated by
comparing arbitration of a contract dispute with the arbitration of a
doping accusation. In a contract dispute, the parties are arguing over
223. CAS Code R33 requires that each arbitrator disclose any circumstances likely to affect
his independence. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R33. At the beginning of each arbitration, each
arbitrator is requested to complete a form on which he or she declares any circumstance likely to
affect his independence. Interview with Matthieu Reeb, Secretary General, CAS, in Lausanne,
Switzerland (May 25, 2004) (on file with author).
224. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R33, 40.3, 54.
225. Id. at R34.
226. The standard applied by ICAS in deciding disqualification requests is one of Swiss
public law and a difficult standard to satisfy. Interview with Matthieu Reeb, supra note 223 (May
25, 2004).
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their obligations under the contract and whether there was a breach of
these obligations. The remedy can be either specific performance or
compensatory damages. On the other hand, in a doping case, one party,
the USADA, accuses the other party of violating disciplinary rules and
the potential remedy is a two-year suspension. The difference in the
remedy is the critical difference that makes the process like a
prosecution. A two-year suspension is a penalty or a punishment.
Arguably, if the remedy of a doping case would be limited to specific
performance or compensatory damages (designed to make the parities
whole) the athlete would only be disqualified from the competition
involved or suspended as long as the drug involved enhanced the
athlete's abilities.
Indeed, the Swiss Federal Tribunal expressed this view when it
declared that a suspension, such as what flows from a doping violation,
is a "genuine statutory punishment that affects the legal interests of the
person. ' 227  As a prosecution-like proceeding imposing a statutory
punishment, the practice of party-appointed arbitrators creates a taint on
the proceeding. The panel in a prosecution-like proceeding should be as
beyond reproach as possible, and party-appointed arbitrators create
reproach.
The CAS declaration and challenge procedure is laudable and
effective, but not entirely sufficient to remove the taint of parties
appointing friendly arbitrators. The CAS does not investigate the
completeness and truthfulness of the declarations. 228 The challenge
procedure standard is that of Swiss public law, a tough standard to
satisfy.229 The declaration and challenge procedure only stops the
appointment of a clearly-biased arbitrator, but it does not stop the
appointment of party-friendly arbitrators. The publication of reasoned
decisions does help prevent undue influence by friendly arbitrators: the
arbitrators must explain and support their decision publicly.
Nevertheless, publication does not prevent undue subtle influence; it
may only expose blatant examples.
If the CAS wishes to reduce the appearance-if not the reality-of
undue influence by party appointed friendly arbitrator, it could do away
with party-appointed arbitrators in disciplinary cases and use a lottery
system for the appointment of arbitrators. In such a system the CAS
227. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (lst Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003 para. 2.1, translation available at http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/
SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
228. Interview with Matthieu Reeb, supra note 223 (May 25, 2004).
229. Id.
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would select all three arbitrators by lot and then allow each party a
limited number of peremptory strikes. A random appointment process
would not allow either side to claim that the other side or the CAS
manipulated the panel composition. Furthermore, the overall credibility
of the decision would be enhanced.
A potential downside to using a random appointment process would
be that parties lose the security of having an advocate on the panel.
Given the choice between a random system and the current system,
some parties might reasonably choose the current system because they
prefer the security provided with the appointment of one friendly
arbitrator-knowing that the other side will appoint an unfriendly
arbitrator--over the insecurity of risking a panel with no friendly faces
on it. This insecurity would be increased when a party faces a closed
panel that it feels is dominated by unfriendly faces. All of this begs the
threshold question: which selection system reduces the likelihood of
biased arbitrators tainting the process? Picking between the two
systems may require a choice between: (1) a system that is based on
only a slightly cynical view of the arbitration process; and (2) a system
that is based on a very cynical view of the arbitration process.
Adopting the random selection process over the current system would
be based on the assumption that under the current system, parties can
find friendly arbitrators who will identify with their position. This
assumption stems from a cynical view of arbitration. But choosing the
random process would also be based on assumptions. It would assume
that there are a limited number of "friendly" arbitrators on the master
list and that the odds are good that the peremptory strikes will be
enough to ensure an unbiased panel. This second assumption, however,
is the optimistic view of arbitration. Continuing with the current system
would admit that many or all arbitrators are friendly to one side or the
other and that it is safer to have at least one arbitrator friendly to each
position on the panel than risk a panel with three unfriendly arbitrators
on it. Keeping the current system might just require an even more
cynical view of arbitration.
Perhaps there is a middle ground that recognizes the parties' fears,
but at the same time puts faith in the majority of arbitrators to be
neutral. In this kind of combined system, each party would retain the
right to appoint one arbitrator, but the third arbitrator would be
randomly selected and each party allowed one strike. Such a combined
system would retain the security of appointing a friendly arbitrator,
while reducing the insecurity (particularly from the athlete's
perspective) of the swing vote arbitrator being selected by an institution
that the parties may not trust. Selecting the third party arbitrator by lot
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would also help insulate the CAS from claims of influencing the
process. Nevertheless, it is important to note that for any system to
work well, as much information as possible about each arbitrator should
be made available to the parties, so that the parties may make well
informed decisions. In addition to a resume for each arbitrator, the CAS
should list every case that an arbitrator has decided on its web site list of
arbitrators.
2. North American-CAS Independence
The question of the North American CAS institutional independence
has been thrust into the limelight recently by several high profile cases
and involves several preliminary questions. 230 Several cases arising out
of the BALCO matter, including one case that has been taken to the
Federal Courts, have raised concerns that the USADA and the USOC
exert undue influence over the AAA-CAS arbitration process.
231
Before an analysis of AAA-CAS can be done, it must first be
determined whether the institution in question is North American-CAS
or the AAA.
Under the Supplementary Procedures, doping cases-cases brought
by USADA-are administered by "the AAA through the AAA Vice
President then serving as the Secretary" for North American-CAS.232
This reference to both the AAA and to North American-CAS creates
some initial confusion about which institution is really administering
USADA cases. This confusion is compounded by the reference to the
establishment of decentralized offices by CAS in the Code 233 and the
right, under the Supplementary Procedures, to appeal an AAA-CAS
decision to the CAS.2 34 Combined, these provisions suggest the
existence of a single entity, known as the CAS, with a branch office in
North America. If there is in fact a single entity, that conclusion could
have significant legal consequences. 235 However, a close examination
of the Supplementary Procedures shows that it is the AAA that performs
230. See, e.g., Jacobs v. USA Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that the
AAA sided with the USADA in concluding that the arbitration should proceed under the
Supplementary Procedures rather than the Commercial Rules).
231. See id. (discussing the interplay between the AAA-CAS, USADA, and USOC).
232. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-2.
233. Id.
234. Id. at R-49A, -57.
235. If North American-CAS is legally part of CAS, in other words CAS and North
American-CAS are one legal entity, it is possible that CAS's declaration of Lausanne as the legal
seat of CAS could mean that NA-CAS cases are subject to Swiss law and not U.S. law. See CAS
CODE, supra note 8, at Sl (stating that the seat of the CAS is established in Lausanne,
Switzerland).
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most, if not all, of the important administration tasks.236 Therefore, it is
important to first examine the AAA.
a. Institutional Independence from Governing Bodies
The proper test to evaluate AAA independence from USADA and the
USOC is whether its funding and the USOC's and USADA's control of
the AAA constitute "circumstances [that would] produce the appearance
of prejudice and cast doubt over [a] judge's impartiality." 237 As for the
question of the AAA's funding: AAA's administrative costs in handling
USADA cases are paid by the USADA.238 Otherwise, the AAA is a
large non-profit arbitration institution that does not rely upon funding
from the USADA, the USOC, or any other party to the USADA-
initiated cases for its existence. This is an important difference from the
CAS, which does rely upon funding from the parties that appear before
it for its continued existence. 239 Because the AAA does not rely upon
funding from the parties that appear before it for its continued existence,
it cannot be said that the AAA's funding casts doubts on its institutional
impartiality.
240
The second question in the test for institutional independence is
whether the USADA and the USOC exert any control over the AAA's
administration of arbitration proceedings. The Supplementary
Procedures and the USADA's Protocol do not contain any provisions
giving the USOC or USADA a direct say in the AAA's administration
of the arbitration process. The allegations in current litigation and
conflicting information from NA-CAS and AAA officials raise some
red flags. In Jacobs v. USADA, the plaintiff alleged that the USADA
conducted training sessions for North American-CAS arbitrators and
pays all of their expenses. 24 1 Additionally, AAA and NA-CAS officials
have given conflicting information or have been unable to explain who
nominates AAA arbitrators to the CAS master list, and in one case
236. See AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-10, -13, -19 (stating
that the AAA conducts administrative conferences, oversees the selection of arbitrators, and
decides any challenges to an arbitrator).
237. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003 at para. 3.3.3, translation available at http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/
SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005)
238. USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 110, at § 10(e).
239. See supra Part Il.B. 1 (discussing the funding for CAS).
240. While the AAA does not rely on USADA's business for its existence, the desire to retain
USADA's business or frequent and consistent contact with USADA representatives may still
influence individual AAA officials.
241. Brief for the plaintiff, Jacobs v. USA Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004) (on file
with author).
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suggested that the USADA screens or appoints them. 242  Assuming,
arguendo, that these allegations are accurate, and then adding the
possibility of indirect control through the pressure to please a consistent
client, there still does not appear to be enough control of the AAA by
USADA and the USOC to conclude that the AAA is dependent.
However, if these allegations are true, the USADA is tainting the
current pool of arbitrators by conducting ex-parte training sessions and
it should not be permitted to nominate or play any role in selecting the
master list of arbitrators. Thus, the ICAS should refuse to consider
arbitrators screened or nominated by the USADA. If the USOC is
consulting the USADA on nominations, the USOC has committed an
ethical breach that should be stopped immediately.
b. Master List Creation
To be on the master list of NA-CAS arbitrators, an arbitrator must
satisfy the requirements of both the CAS and the AAA. 24 ' Next, the
arbitrator must be approved by the ICAS. 244 After being approved by
the ICAS, an arbitrator then appears on both the CAS and AAA-CAS
master list.245  There are currently forty-three potential AAA-CAS
arbitrators.2 46 However, who nominates the arbitrators to the ICAS and
whether those nominations are required to-or actually do-fall into the
five categories of nominations that make-up the CAS master list is not
covered in the Supplementary Procedures. Further, inquiries of the NA-
CAS and the AAA officials have produced conflicting answers.
247
242. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity in how the master
arbitrator list is compiled and the lack of clarification provided by the AAA and North American-
CAS officials).
243. See AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-3 (stating that the
National Panel of Arbitrators consists of those that are both CAS and AAA arbitrators).
244. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S3, 6.
245. A separate list of North American-CAS arbitrators is not kept. E-mail from Jennifer
Coffman, Regional Secretary, North American-CAS, to Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor
of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law (June 7, 2004) (on file with author). All North
American-CAS arbitrators appear on the master CAS list. Id. However, there are forty-three
arbitrators from North America on the CAS master list, and Regina Jacobs, in her claim against
USADA claims that she has been told by North American-CAS and AAA sources that there are
currently anywhere from twenty-five to thirty-eight North American-CAS arbitrators. Jacobs v.
USA Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85, 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
246. There are currently forty-three arbitrators on the CAS master list from North America.
See Court of Arbitration for Sport, Master List of CAS Arbitrators, at http://www.tas-cas.org
[hereinafter CAS Arbitrators] (providing biographical information on each of the arbitrators) (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005).
247. North American-CAS Regional Secretary Jennifer Coffman was unaware of whether
North American-CAS arbitrators fell into the five categories listed in S14. E-mail from Jennifer
Coffman, Regional Secretary, North American-CAS, to Michael S. Straubel, Associate Professor
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Recent high profile cases have raised a number concerns about the
composition of the NA-CAS master list and thereby the method of
constructing the master list.248 The leading concern is that many, if not
the majority, of the arbitrators are biased due to their current or previous
connections with the USOC, USADA, or NGBS. Of the forty-three
AAA-CAS arbitrators, nine have connections with the USOC, eleven
have connection with NGBs, four have connections with IFs, two with
the IOC and Olympic Organizing Committees, and one is the President
of WADA.249  A similar concern is that a large number of the
arbitrators have been influenced by contracts with or educational
programs put on by the USADA.250 The allegation of improper
contacts by the USADA is not a structural problem and can be easily
prevented in the future. Currently there are concerns, however, that
many of the arbitrators have contacts with the governing bodies of the
Olympic Movement that could influence their rulings. This is a
structural concern that should be addressed.
Similar to questions about the CAS master list, the questions exist of
whether these concerns rise to the level of producing the appearance of
prejudice and casting doubt over a judge's impartiality and whether the
number of potentially biased arbitrators populating the master list be
reduced? The inclusion of a large number of arbitrators that have
connections with the governing bodies of the Olympic Movement, if not
raising the appearance of doubt, at least raise a red flag that the NA-
CAS should be concerned about. This concern is particularly
heightened by the fact the NA-CAS arbitrator only hears doping cases
that pit the Olympic Movement's representative, USADA, against
athletes.
There are four possible ways to deal with this taint on the NA-CAS.
The most drastic is to purge the master list of all arbitrators with current
or recent ties to the governing bodies of the Olympic Movement. This
step would certainly enhance the credibility of the process. But would it
simultaneously gut the list of experienced and informed arbitrators?
The second alternative is to increase the number of arbitrators with no
connection to the Olympic Movement. For example, the proposed
athletes' union could nominate arbitrators until there is a fair balance on
the master list. This alternative would dilute the taint, but may just
increase the number of conflicts of interest by adding arbitrators tied to
of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law (June 7, 2004) (on file with author).
248. See, e.g., Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88 (arguing that arbitrators should be selected under the
Commercial Rules).
249. See supra note 246 (discussing the CAS master list of arbitrators).
250. See CAS Arbitrators, supra note 246 (detailing biographical data of arbitrators).
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the athletes and their representative body. The third alternative is to go
to either an open list or an alternative list of arbitrators such as the
AAAs list of commercial arbitrators. This alternative would remove
some of the taint but it would forsake the benefit of using arbitrators
who are knowledgeable and experienced in sport and doping law.
251
Finally, the fourth alternative is to create a permanent, or semi-
permanent, small list of full-time arbitrators completely lacking in, or
with very minimal connections with both the Olympic Movement and
athletes' causes. This kind of panel would function like full-time
professional judges. This solution would remove the taint but change
the nature of the process from traditional arbitration to something new.
Considering the prosecutorial nature of all current NA-CAS cases,
the composition of the master list and the process of selecting a panel of
arbitrators, as will be discussed below, should be changed to improve
the integrity and legitimacy of the process. Of the four possible
solutions listed above, the best long-term solution would be the first: to
establish a list of arbitrators with no current or recent connections with
the Olympic Movement or athletes. The nominating and screening
process would have to be open and interests other than those of the
governing bodies, such as the athletes', would have to be involved.
Then the arbitrators would have to pledge not to represent or be
involved in the governing activity of governing bodies or athletes'
interests.
Furthermore, purging the NA-CAS master list of arbitrators with
connections to Olympic Movement Governing bodies and athletes that
have appeared before the CAS would not reduce the quality of the
arbitration process and instead improve the legitimacy and credibility of
the arbitration process. While the CAS seeks arbitrators with expertise
and experience in both arbitration and sport, expertise and experience in
sport is not limited to experience within the Olympic Movement
governing bodies, and the sporting world is very big. Further, of the
two backgrounds, arbitration experience is more valuable than a sport
background. It is the ability to understand the rules and doctrines at
issue in an arbitration that is important. A sound legal background and
experience is more valuable in understanding the relevant rules and
doctrines than the desire for a sports background. Therefore, filling the
NA-CAS master list with arbitrators from outside the Olympic
Movement, but who have significant legal experience, will not harm
and only improve the arbitration process.
251. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S14, 16 (requiring that the arbitrators be selected from a
varying pool and that each arbitrator be familiar with the sport and law and be objective).
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c. Selection of Panel Members
The 2005 amendments to the Supplementary Procedures has made
the panel selection process more like that of the CAS, and consequently,
has removed some of the concerns that existed before.252 Now, when a
three arbitrator panel is used, each party selects one from the entire list
of arbitrators and the two appointed arbitrators work together to select
the third arbitrator.253  In the event the two appointed arbitrators are
unable to agree on the third, the parties are then asked to prioritize the
remaining choices, so that the AAA can facilitate an agreement. 254
Failing agreement, the AAA will select the third arbitrator.255  The
parties may then challenge that appointment if they are unhappy with
the selection, by raising concerns about their ability to be neutral and
impartial-it appears, however, that this same kind of appeal can not be
raised with respect to the other party's selection. 256 These appeals are
decided by the AAA.257
The same concerns that raise doubt about the panel selection process
of the CAS apply to the AAA-CAS process. Permitting the parties to
appoint panel members creates the opportunity to appoint friendly
arbitrators that the parties believe are likely to, if not rule in their favor,
be sympathetic to their position. The practice of parties appointing
arbitrators is akin to judge shopping, a practice that offends notions of
due process in the United States. Further, because the AAA can both
select the panel chairman and decides any challenge against that
chairman, there is a fear that the process is tightly controlled by an
institution that could be influenced by the USOC and USADA.
Whether or not these concerns are in fact valid, they do create the
appearance of prejudice and cast doubt over the impartiality of the
252. Before the 2005 Amendments both parties had to select their party-appointed arbitrators
from a list of 10 arbitrators created by the AAA. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES R-
13 (2000). This power gave the AAA control over the selection of the arbitrators. Also, the AAA
appointed the third arbitrator, who became the chair of the panel. Id.
253. See infra Part HI.A.3.b (detailing this method as employed in CAS arbitrator selection).
254. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-13 (d)(i).
255. Id. at R-13(c)(2).
256. Supplementary Procedure R-19 states that the parties may challenge the independence of
a "neutral arbitrator," but does not state that any other arbitrators, including a party-appointed
arbitrator may be challenged. Id. A reading of other sections of the Supplementary Procedures,
particularly Rule 15 and Rule 20, suggests that the terms "chairman" and "neutral arbitrator" are
synonymous in this context. Id. at R-15, -20. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that
only the chairman can be challenged.
257. Id. at R-19.
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process, and certainly call the fairness and legitimacy of the process into
question.
With very important issues, such as an athlete's reputation, career,
and income involved, the NA-CAS arbitration system should strive to
eliminate or at the very least reduce taint wherever possible. Two
possible solutions exist that may reduce this taint. First, in addition to
removing from the master list arbitrators that have current or recent
connections with parties, a random appointment system for all three
panel members or at least the panel chairman could be used. Second,
the parties could be allowed to challenge the independence of all three
arbitrators, before the ICAS or a similar body outside of the AAA.
Of the systems discussed above, the best would be a combined
system, where each party would retain the right to appoint one
arbitrator, with the third arbitrator randomly selected, allowing each
party one strike of the potential third arbitrator. Such a combined
system would retain the security of appointing a friendly arbitrator
while reducing the insecurity of the swing vote arbitrator selected in a
manner that the parties may not trust. Further, as was suggested for the
CAS process, regardless of the process chosen, it should be as
transparent as possible. The master list of arbitrators should be publicly
available, and in addition, the names and positions of the people making
administrative decisions should be available.
C. Choice of Substantive Law
A fair and well-constructed arbitration process should include a
process for selecting the procedural rules and the substantive laws that
govern the arbitration. However, there should also be a back-up choice
of law to fill the gaps that invariably occur in the primary choice of
procedural and substantive laws, and importantly a body of mandatory
law that will ensure that the process protects basic notions of fairness
and due process. For example, for the CAS Appeals Division, the
choice of procedural rules is the Code of Sports-related Arbitration and
Mediation Rules, the body of law chosen to fill the gaps in the Code is
the law agreed to by the parties or the law of the IF's home state, and
the method for ensuring fairness is the Swiss Statute on Private
International Law.25 8  This Section, which examines the CAS and
AAA-CAS choice of law provisions, uses a template that looks at
whether the choice of procedural rules or the choices of substantive
258. See CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R27, 28, 58 (detailing procedural rules). The effect of
designating Lausanne, Switzerland, as the seat of all CAS arbitrations is to subject the Swiss
statutes to Private International Law.
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laws includes these three categories: (1) an initial choice; (2) a back-up,
gap-filling choice; and (3) mandatory due process protections.
1. Basic Provisions
Both the CAS and AAA-CAS rely on substantive law and procedural
rules established by Code. These basic, initial choices of law are not
complete, and thus have to be supplemented with further, gap-filling
law.
a. CAS Code
The Code's procedural rules apply whenever the parties agree to
259submit a dispute to CAS. The Code does not specifically provide for
a backup body of procedural law to fill the gaps that may occur in the
Code's procedural rules. Thus far, the practice of CAS panels has been
to look to the back-up substantive law chosen by the parties to fill the
gaps. 26  By designating its legal seat as Lausanne, Switzerland, the
CAS has indirectly designated that the fairness of its process in general,
as well as the process in each individual arbitration, can be tested under
Swiss law, specifically the Swiss Statute on Private International
Law.2 6 1 The Swiss Statute on Private International Law sets out the
minimum requirements for international arbitrations-such as
impartiality and due process-required when the legal seat is in
Switzerland.
262
The substantive law applied in CAS arbitration is the law chosen by
the parties.263 The law chosen by the parties can be the rules set by the
governing body, or state laws. 64  In the absence of a choice by the
parties, the Ordinary Division uses Swiss law and the Appellate
Division uses the law of the sports body's country of domicile.265 In
practice, however, the only choice of law is the IF's rules and the panels
are thus forced to use Swiss law and the sports body's home law to fill
259. Id. at R27. Such an agreement may be expressed either in a contract or may be included
in a sports-governing body's rules. Id. Such a rule is considered to be a contractual agreement
between the governing body and a member of the sports organization. Id. However, it can be
argued that such a "contractual agreement" is a contract of adhesion.
260. See, e.g., S. v. FINA, CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II
1998-2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (applying the parties' choice of Swiss law), available
at http://www.klumberarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
261. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm. Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of 27
May 2003.
262. Id.
263. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R45, 58.
264. Id. at R58.
265. Id.
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the gaps. 266  Also, in the Appellate Division, panels are permitted to
apply any law it deems necessary, as long as the reasons for using such
law are explained.267 When CAS panels have used this third option,
they have resorted to general principles of law, 2
68 civil law doctrines, 269
and basic concepts of human rights. 27  The use of back-up laws, in
addition to filling gaps in an IF's substantive rules, has also provided
CAS panels with much-needed due process standards to help ensure
fairness in the decision process.
271
b. AAA-CAS Supplementary Procedures
The procedure of AAA-CAS arbitrations is governed by the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, as modified by the
Supplementary Procedures. 272  However, in practice, the Commercial
Arbitration Rules play little, if any, role. The Supplementary
Procedures do not provide for a back-up source of domestic law to fill
gaps.274  Further, the Supplementary Procedures do not designate a
legal seat for AAA-CAS arbitrations, as the CAS Code does, and
thereby does not designate a body of mandatory law to ensure the
fairness of AAA-CAS procedures. 275 However, as will be discussed in
more detail below, the Swiss statute on Private International Law and
the Federal Arbitration Act may apply to AAA-CAS arbitrations and
266. Strahija v. FINA, CAS 2003/A/507 para. 6.1 (Aug. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.sportslaw.nllcategorieen/print.asp?pnr=42 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
267. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R58.
268. See B. v. ITU, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 330
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (applying the civil law concept of strict liability), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
269. Id.
270. See H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (Dec. 22, 2000) DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 11 1998-
2000 410 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (explaining that the human rights of an accused athlete must
be preserved even if not provided for in the federation rules), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
271. See S. v. FINA, CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 11 1998-
2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) (asserting that the Panel must guarantee equal treatment of the parties and ensure
the right to be heard).
272. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-1.
273. A survey of all AAA-CAS awards finds no cites to the Commercial Rules.
274. The 2000 Supplementary Procedures in Rule 33 provided that prior CAS decisions may
be used to mitigate IF rules. That provision has been removed from the 2005 Supplementary
Procedures, thereby calling into question the role of CAS precedent in AAA-CAS.
275. The Supplementary Procedures do not contain a declaration of a seat of the arbitration.
Id. at R- 11. However, Rule 11 does require that any CAS hearing held under these rules be held
in the United States. Id. If held in the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act likely applies
unless there has been a contractual choice of Swiss law replacing the Federal Arbitration Act.
See infra Part 1IC. 1 .b.2 (discussing Bremen).
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provide the vital fairness check.276
The substantive law that applies in AAA-CAS arbitrations is the rules
of the World Anti-Doping Code and IF involved.277 However, there is
no provision that acts as a gap-filler. Therefore, there is no template for
ensuring the fairness of the World Anti-Doping Code and IF rules, such
as a national body of law.
2. The Application of the Swiss Statute
on Private International Law to AAA-CAS Proceedings
The Code designates Lausanne, Switzerland as CAS's seat.278 The
purpose and result of selecting a "seat" for all CAS arbitrations is to
pick a municipal law to test and ultimately validate the legitimacy of the
CAS arbitration process. Selecting the law to govern the arbitration (les
arbitri),27 9 as opposed to the law governing the merits of the dispute,
confers nationality upon CAS awards for purposes of enforcement
under the New York Convention 280 and creates confidence in the
system and ensures basic fairness within Swiss law. All international
arbitrations, defined as an arbitration involving at least one non-Swiss
citizen, must satisfy the requirements of the Swiss Statue on Private
International Law.
2 81
CAS and its arbitration process have been tested in admittedly limited
circumstances, under the Statute on Private International Law. In all
challenges to CAS, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has found CAS and its
process impartial and fair.282 However, because these challenges came
from arbitrations physically held within Switzerland, there is some
question of whether the concept of a "seat" designation will have
extraterritorial application to arbitrations physically held outside of
Switzerland. While the Swiss Federal Tribunal has accepted the
concept of a split between the physical location of an arbitration hearing
276. See infra Part III.C. 1 .b.2 (discussing the protections of the Federal Arbitration Act).
277. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-33.
278. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R28.
279. For more discussion of the concept of lex arbitri, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS
LAW 100-102 (Kluwer Law International 2001).
280. To enforce an arbitration award under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards the award must be made in the territory of a
member state. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970).
281. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003, translation available at http://www.spotrecht.org/urteile/SchwBGzuTAS.pdf (last
visited Apr. 23, 2005).
282. Id.
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and the legal location or "seat" of the arbitration hearing, the important
question of whether foreign courts (such as the courts of the United
States) will accept the "seat" doctrine remains.
283
This question of extraterritoriality has gained increasing import with
the advent of "ad hoc," on-location CAS tribunals. Starting with the
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, special CAS ad hoc tribunals have been
established at the Olympic Games to hear disputes arising during the
Olympic Games. All of those ad hoc tribunals have designated their
"seat" as Lausanne, Switzerland. It can be argued that the ad hoc
tribunals are legally different, for purposes of analyzing the "seat"
question, from the permanent tribunals in Switzerland and the
decentralized CAS tribunals such as AAA-CAS. In fact, a challenge of
the Sydney Olympics ad hoc tribunal framed an analysis that could
apply to determining whether AAA-CAS's "seat" is Lausanne,
Switzerland.284 In Raguz v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court of New South
Wales Court of Appeal found that the selection of a "seat" was at its
essence a contractual choice of law that would be upheld as long as it
did not violate Australian public law and policy.285 Since it did not
violate Australian law and the parties had contractually agreed to
Lausanne as the seat of the arbitration, the Court found that it did not
have the jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the contract
choice of Lausanne as the seat of the arbitration.
2 86
The analysis used by the Australian Court in Raguz could very
conceivably be followed by a United States Court hearing a challenge to
the selection of Lausanne as the seat of AAA-CAS arbitrations. In the
court's analysis, the first step would be to determine if an athlete in an
AAA-CAS hearing had agreed to the selection of Lausanne. Such an
agreement would have to rest on a series of interlocking contracts.
287
The first contract would be the athlete's membership in the governing
NGB and IF. The second contract would be the agreement or statutorily
required connection between the NGB and the USOC. The third
contract would be the contract between the USOC (or possibly IF) and
CAS to decide the disputes. The fourth contract, or connection, would
be that the North American Decentralized Office of CAS is part of a
larger CAS structure governed by the Code of Sport-related
283. Id.
284. Raguz v. Sullivan & ORS, 2000 N.S.W.C.A. 240 (Sept. 1, 2000).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. The Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal in Raguz, relied on the same
reasoning. Id. at para. 65.
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Arbitration. 2 88  Assuming the court finds that there has been a
contractual choice, the next question is whether it would honor this
choice of law agreement.
In the United States, a contract choice of law clause is evaluated
under the rubric initially established in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore.289
Under the Bremen test, a choice of law clause will be honored unless it
is unreasonable. A clause can be unreasonable if it was the result of
fraud, undue influence, overweening bargaining power, or will result in
the breach of an important public policy found in mandatory public
law. 29  Using the Bremen test in the case of selecting Lausanne as the
seat of arbitration, the strongest arguments for declaring the clause
unreasonable would be that it was the result of overweening bargaining
power291 and that it violates public policy found in the Federal
Arbitration Act or Amateur Sports Act. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the clause was not the result of overweening bargaining
power, the effect of the Federal Arbitration Act and Amateur Sports Act
should be briefly examined.
The Federal Arbitration Act, in section ten, lists a series of grounds
upon which an arbitration award may be set aside. 292  The intent of
Congress, in drafting section ten, was to ensure an impartial arbitration
process. 29 3 Similarly, the Amateur Sports Act, in sections 220509 and220529, attempts to ensure an impartial arbitration process to protect
288. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at S6; AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note
10, at R-2.
289. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
290. Id. at 12-13.
291. It could be argued that the contract between an athlete and an NGB, represented by the
athlete's membership in the NGB, is a contract of adhesion. In order to compete, an athlete must
join the NGB and the athlete is forced to accept the NGB's rules and conditions of membership as
they exist and without the ability to negotiate over those terms.
292. Those grounds include:
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced;
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or
where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
293. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
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athletes' rights. 294  Considering the goal of both Acts to ensure an
impartial arbitration process, it is fair to characterize these as laws
expressing public policy concerns of Congress. 295  As expressions of
important public policy concerns, the question becomes whether Swiss
law, particularly the Statute on Private International Law, provides the
same protections as the Federal Arbitration Act and the Amateur Sports
Act provide. A reading of the decision by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in
A. & B. v. International Olympic Committee,296 suggests that the Statute
on Private International Law is generous in its protections and would
likely satisfy the test employed in Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's.2 97 Thus,
the selection of Lausanne as the seat would likely be upheld.
3. The Use of Supplementary Law
The Code permits CAS panels to use-in the event gaps exist in the
rules of a sports governing body-the laws of domestic legal systems
and, in some cases, any rule of law the panel deems appropriate.
298
Both Ordinary and Appellate CAS panels have found it necessary to fall
back on these supplementary sources of law. While the primary source
of supplementary law used by panels is Swiss domestic law, largely due
to the fact that many IFs are headquartered in Switzerland, panels have
also drawn upon the domestic law of the United Kingdom,299 general
principles of law, 30 0  civil law traditions, 30 1 and concepts from
international human rights law. 30 2  The need to apply supplementary
294. Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (1978). Section 220509 states that an
ombudsman will handle athletes' complaints and concerns. 36 U.S.C. § 220509 (1978). Section
220529 provides for an arbitration process which employs the AAA and AAA Commercial Rules
for parties aggrieved by the decisions of the USOC and its member NGBs. 36 U.S.C. § 220529.
295. A mandatory law is one that applies as a matter of law rather than by the choice of the
parties and expresses the intent of Congress to protect an important public policy. An example of
a mandatory law is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1936).
296. A. & B. v. Int'l Olympic Comm., Swiss Fed. Tribunal (1st Civ. Chamber) Judgment of
27 May 2003.
297. See Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a choice of
foreign law will be upheld even if it means that it will result in an escape from mandatory United
States law if the foreign law does not offend the policy behind the United States law).
298. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R45, 58.
299. See ITF v. K., CAS 99/A/223 (Aug. 31, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000
345 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (applying the parties' choice of English law), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
300. See B. v. ITU, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 330
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (applying civil law concepts to supplemental CAS rules), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
301. Id.
302. See H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (Dec. 22, 2000). DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 11 1998-
2000 410 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (providing the accused athlete an opportunity to discharge
himself), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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law usually arises from one of three categories: (1) procedural rules and
doctrines; (2) due process requirements; and (3) definitions of IF
rules.
30 5
Quite different from the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, the
AAA-CAS Supplementary Procedures do not explicitly permit recourse
to supplementary sources of law. 30 6  However, in a few cases, AAA-
CAS panels found it necessary to fall back on supplementary source
307material. Without guidance in selecting the source of supplementary
law, AAA-CAS panels are likely to use the law that the arbitrators are
most familiar with, namely, the law of the United States. It is open to
question as to whether this lack of guidance for choosing supplementary
law in the AAA-CAS Supplementary Procedures and the open-ended
choice of supplementary law found in the Code is equitable. 309
4. Choice of Law Analysis
Since the inception of CAS arbitration, panels have found it
necessary to resort to supplementary sources of law to decide the cases
before them. When an IF's rules are inconsistent or ambiguous, panels
have resorted to rules of statutory construction. When the rules of an IF
are incomplete, panels have turned to general principles of law and
domestic law to fill the gaps.309 When the fairness of an IF substantive
rule or the fairness of IF conduct is challenged, panels have relied upon
general principles of law and domestic law to resolve those claims.31 0
303. See S. v. FINA, CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000) DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-
2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (supplementing with Swiss domestic law), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); B. v. FINA, CAS 98/211 (June 7,
1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 255 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (detailing
appellate procedures), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
304. See, e.g., B. v. ITU, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000
330 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (discussing basic legal and procedural guarantees such as the
presumption of innocence), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
305. See, e.g., id. (discussing the relevant IF rules).
306. AAA-CAS SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 10, at R-33.
307. See, e.g., USADA v. Neben, AAA No. 30-190-00713-03 (October 2003) (dissent by
Christopher Campbell); USADA v. Ina, AAA No. 30-190-00814-02 (October 2002) (dissent by
Christopher Campbell).
308. It could be argued that the absence of a supplementary law selection gives the arbitrators
the freedom to fashion the best result for the dispute before them rather than being limited to the
solution found in the supplementary law.
309. See S. v. FINA, CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-
2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (using Swiss law to fill in the gaps), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
310. See B. v. IJF, CAS 98/214 (Mar. 17, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 308
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (applying French law as supplementary), available at
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Without being able to apply supplementary sources of law, these
panels would not have been able to render reasoned and well-supported
decisions, and the panels would have been forced to use their personal
notions and experience to decide the cases. While an arbitrator's
personal experience may be sufficient to fill some gaps in the law,
relying on this personal input for qualified, fair decisions bets the entire
process on the luck of finding a sufficiently experienced arbitrator on
the panel. It certainly does not enhance the credibility and legitimacy of
the arbitration process. Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation that
the open-ended nature of AAA-CAS Supplementary Procedures creates.
Because the Supplementary Procedures do not provide for the use of
supplementary sources of law, AAA-CAS panels can find themselves
without sufficient guidance to decide new issues and arguments. This
may have been the situation in two AAA-CAS cases where at least one
of the panel members felt compelled to issue a dissenting opinion that
relied on United States domestic law for guidance.311 A lack of guiding
authority, however, is not the only reason to provide for the use of
supplementary law in the CAS and AAA-CAS arbitration process.
Supplementary law can be the source of due process and substantive
law protections for the parties, two essential assets in the adjudication
process.
These protections are of heightened importance in doping cases,
which are increasing in numbers and importance, internationally.
Though often characterized as a contractual relationship, the
relationship between athletes and the Olympic Movement in
disciplinary and doping cases is not one of equal power. The Olympic
Movement drafts the rules and operates the administrative machinery,
thus giving it a more powerful position. Due process protections, such
as those found in the Swiss Statute on Private International Law, 3 12 can
help protect the balance of power between the parties and ensure the
fairness of the arbitration process. Protections like these need to be
expanded to enable the CAS to adequately handle the doping cases
headed its way.
The AAA-CAS Supplementary Procedures and the Code of Sports-
related Arbitration should be amended to provide a single source of
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
311. For an example of a CAS decision with a dissenting opinion, see ITF v. K., CAS
999/A/223 (Aug. 31, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002),
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
312. See G. v. FEI, CAS 91/53 (Jan. 15, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 79
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (the panel used the general principle of the law of interpretation contra
stipulatorem), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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supplementary law. Creating a single supplementary of law, such as
Swiss law, would make CAS and AAA-CAS decisions more consistent,
and thus improve the quality of the decisions, the efficiency of the
arbitration process, and the fairness of the process.
Choosing Swiss law as the back-up source of law for all CAS and
AAA-CAS arbitrations would avoid placing arbitrators in the
predicament of having to refer to an unfamiliar body of law to decide a
case. Swiss law, because it has a rich history of dealing with sports law
issues and because it has been widely and consistently used by many
CAS panels, is as good if not better than any other country's law. Non-
Swiss educated arbitrators would initially be at a disadvantage in
applying Swiss law, but could easily learn it. Further, they would not
face the problem of becoming familiar with another country's laws-for
example South Korea's laws for Judo cases-the next time they were on
a panel. 313 Also, athletes with similar charges against them, and similar
defenses, would not run the risk of being treated differently because the
panel used different supplementary law. In an example of the inequity
of the current, scattered process, in the penalty phase of a doping
hearing, one country's law may prohibit a four-year suspension while
another country's law may allow a four-year suspension.3 14 This kind
of disparity completely destroys the credibility of CAS and must be
remedied.
Using a single source of supplementary law would lead to higher
quality decisions and precedent. As arbitrators become more familiar
with Swiss law, both by applying it in cases before them and by seeing
and reading opinions where it was used in other CAS decisions, their
comfort level with Swiss law and in turn the quality of their decisions
using Swiss law would improve. CAS and AAA-CAS precedent would
be legitimized because there would not be conflicting precedent due to
the use of conflicting supplemental law. But most importantly, using
Swiss law would provide a consistent touchstone for ensuring the
313. See S. v. FEI, CAS 91/56 (June 25, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 93
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (noting that IF rules does not mention the right to present counter
evidence), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); S v. FINA,
CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb,
ed. 2002) (using Swiss law to determine when a change in procedural rules became effective),
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
314. See S. v. FINA, CAS 2000/A/274 (Oct. 19, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS I 1998-
2000 389 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (examining due process fairness of IF introducing new
evidence on appeal not used in the first proceeding), available at http://www.kluwer
arbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); P. v. FINA, CAS 97/180 (Jan. 14, 1999), DIGEST OF
CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 184 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (testing strict liability doctrine under
Swiss law), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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fairness of the arbitration process, an essential feature moving forward
generally, and specifically in the pseudo-criminal doping cases that are
becoming more prevalent.
D. The Development and Use of Precedent
Historically, the notion of 3precedent and its role in arbitration
proceedings has been minimal. 315 Arbitration was originally designed
to seek unique solutions individually tailored to the circumstances of the
dispute before the arbitrators. 3 16 However, arbitration proceedings-
particularly in CAS as well as other situations-are becoming
concerned with consistency, predictability, and fairness. Therefore,
precedent, as a way of promoting consistency, predictability, and
fairness has begun to play a larger role in CAS decisions. But the role
that precedent plays in the decision process seems to vary between CAS
and AAA-CAS. Additionally, the flat structure of CAS does not lend
itself to easily reconciling conflicting precedent.
1. The Role and Production of Precedent in CAS
The Code of Sports-related Arbitration does not specifically speak to
the role of precedent. Code Rules 46 and 59 provide that before an
award can be signed by the arbitrators, it must be reviewed by the CAS
Secretary General who may draw to the panel's attention fundamental
issues of principle. 317 One of the purposes of this process, according to
the current CAS Secretary General, is to allow the Secretary General to
point out discrepancies in their award from existing CAS precedent, so
that the panel may bring the award into line with existing principles, if it
so desires.318 But, as the current Secretary General has stressed, Rules
46 and 59 do not give him the authority to force a change in the award
nor has he expressed a willingness to pressure the panel to change the
award to conform to existing principle. 319 The Secretary General will
only ask that the panel explain in the award why it has departed from
existing principle. Interestingly, this can be seen as a way of bringing
the award into line with existing principle without changing the
outcome of the award, as it will show that existing principle has not
315. S.C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT'L LAWYER
187, 187-206(1989).
316. Id.
317. CAS CODE, supra note 8, at R46, 59.
318. Interview with Matthieu Reeb, Secretary General, Court of Arbitration for Sport, in
Lausanne, Switz. (May 25, 2004) (on file with author).
319. Id.
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been changed.3 20 But, ultimately, the panel can refuse to even explain
its departure from existing principle.
321
CAS panels' use of precedent has become more standardized over
time. But even though CAS precedent has existed for some time, CAS
panel has been slow, until the past several years, to cite and rely on
CAS-created precedent. 322 This sparse use of precedent could be due to
the civil law traditions of the majority of the early and active CAS
arbitrators.3 23  Nevertheless, panels over the past three to four years
have demonstrated and created a willingness to cite and rely on CAS
precedent.324 In fact, several panels have referred to the development of
CAS lex sportive.325  But, unlike AAA-CAS panels, CAS panels
generally limit their use of precedent to that of reference to legal
principles. 32 6
320. Id. Requiring the panel to explain its reasons for departing from existing precedent
would lead to two possible results: the first is that the case is distinguished on its facts and the
precedent is preserved and unchanged; the second is that the precedent is challenged head-on and
a conflict is created. Id.
321. Tom Weir, Jones Quickens Pace of Confronting Drug Use Issue, USA TODAY, June 17,
2004, at 1IC.
322. Court of Arbitration for Sport, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 xxx (Matthieu
Reeb, Ed. 2000) (creating digest to develop jurisprudence and harmonization of judicial rules and
principles within the sports world). For examples of sparing use precedent, see USA Shooting
and Q v. UIT, CAS 94/129 (May 23, 1995), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 345
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005); W. v. X._S.A., CAS 91/45 (MaR. 31, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 33
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005); G. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 91/53 (Jan. 15, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-
1998 79 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005). For examples of mid-life reluctance to rely on precedent, see also B. v. FINA,
CAS 98/211 (June 7, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 255 (Matthieu Reeb, ed.
2002), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); UCI v. FCI,
CAS 98/212 (Feb. 24, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 274 (Matthieu Reeb, ed.
2002), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). But, for
examples of CAS increased use of precedent, see IAAF v. Boulami, CAS 2003/A/452 (Nov. 19,
2003); Baxter v. Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.britski.org.uk/baxter.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); Jovanovic v. USADA, CAS
2002/A/360 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/
arbitrationrulings/arbitrationruling_2_ 1l2002jovanovic.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
323. Interview with Jean-Philippe Rochat, former CAS Secretary General, Lausanne, Switz.
(May, 25, 2004) (on file with the author). CAS's view and use of precedent is the same as the
civil law system's use of precedent. Id.
324. See, e.g., IAAF v. Boulami, CAS 2003/A/452 (rejecting an athlete's argument based on
earlier CAS decisions); Baxter v. Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (rejecting athlete's
argument based on earlier CAS decisions and citing specifically to several earlier CAS
decisions); Jovanovic v. USADA, CAS 2002/A/360 (rejecting the same argument as in Baxter).
325. Canadian Olympic Comm & Scott v. Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/0/373 (Dec. 18,
2003) (finding jurisprudence developed from a number of principles of sports law and
regulation).
326. Id.
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2. The Role and Production of Precedent in AAA-CAS
Prior to their amendment in 2005, the AAA-CAS Supplementary
Procedures, unlike the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, specifically
recognized the role of precedent. 2004 Supplementary Procedure Rule
33(e), which covers choice of law matters, stated that IF and Anti-
Doping Code rules may be mitigated by principles found in CAS
decisions. While the reason for the deletion of reference to CAS
precedent in Supplementary Procedure 33(e) is not known, and its effect
speculative at this time, it is quite likely that the use of CAS precedent
has become a common practice that will continue despite the 2005
amendment. In practice, AAA-CAS panels have made generous use of
Rule 33(e). However, AAA-CAS panels use precedent in the way that
courts in the United States rely on precedent. In addition to using
precedent as a source of legal principles as CAS panels do, AAA-CAS
panels use precedent to produce consistent results by comparing facts of
the case before them with the facts of previous decisions.327 Also, in
addition to comparing facts, the language used by AAA-CAS panels
suggests that they view precedent as close to binding.
328
3. Evaluation of CAS and AAA-CAS Use of Precedent
Both CAS and AAA-CAS panels are increasingly turning to prior
decisions for guidance. While CAS practice is more limited in its
reliance on precedent than AAA-CAS practice, CAS is embracing the
use of precedent in order to help it ensure consistency and quality in its
decisions. However, the structure of CAS could stand in the way of
achieving consistency. Arbitration in general and the CAS structure in
particular is a flat system where all decisions are final and equal in
precedential value. With the exception of appeals from AAA-CAS
327. See, e.g., USADA v. Vencill, AAA-CAS No. 30 190 00291 03 (July 24, 2003) (citing a
series of CAS decisions in order to develop proper sanctions and noting that the panel was not
bound to apply the ISO standard in laboratory testing of the urine sample at issue in the case),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/acfive/arbitration-rulings/arbitration.ruling
7 24 2003_Vencill.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); USADA v. Neben, AAA-CAS 30 190 00713
03 (Oct. 16, 2003) (relying on USADA v. Moninger, AAA-CAS 30 190 00930 02, to conclude
that UCI regulations do not require the USADA to prove or identify the source of of the
prohibited substance in the respondent's urine sample), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/
files/active/ arbitrationrulings/arbitration-ruling_10212003_Neben.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
328. See, e.g., USADA v. Moninger, AAA-CAS 30 190 00930 02 (ApR. 2, 2003) (relying on
the analogous facts and standard of proof found in Blackwelder v. USADA, AAA-CAS 30 190
0012 02, and USADA v. Dickey, AAA-CAS 30 190 00241 02, to hold that respondent failed to
meet its burden of proof that the chain of custody of open bottle of 15 capsules was adequate),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/arbitrationruling
4_3_2003_Moninger.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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decisions to the CAS Appellate Division, there is no review of CAS
decisions that could correct mistakes in the use or development of
precedent, including the reconciliation of conflicting precedent. In a
judicial system, conflicting precedent can be and often is reconciled by
the single supreme court of the system. However, in CAS there is no
single supreme court to reconcile conflicting awards.
Existing conflicts in precedent-in an arbitration setting-may not be
an evil that demands much attention. It can be argued that conflicting
precedent gives subsequent panels a choice of precedent that allows it to
craft the most equitable solution to the present dispute or that time will
allow a sort of Darwinian process where the best precedent is chosen or
survives. But on the other hand, conflicting precedent can lead to
unequal treatment of athletes. Such unequal treatment could
particularly occur in the penalty phase of a doping case.
An example of this unequal treatment can be seen in two recent CAS
Appeals Division decisions involving a conflict over the power of a
CAS appeals panel to increase an athlete's doping sentence. The panel
in Pastorello v. USADA, in an award issued June 27, 2002, specifically
announced that on appeal "there is a possibility that a sentence will be
,329increased." However, the panel in Demetis v. Fgderation
Internationale de Natation Amateur ("FINA"), 33° found that a sentence
cannot be increased. Therefore, while the step of creating a CAS
supreme court might be unnecessary, the use of advisory decisions to
reconcile conflicting precedent should be considered. While not
changing the result of an award, the Secretary General or any party
desiring to reconcile conflicting precedent, would ask a third panel to
reconcile the question of law created by the conflict. Such a process,
while perhaps academic in some sense, would improve the consistency
and predictability of future CAS proceedings. 331 Improved consistency
and predictability are going to be necessary if CAS is going to be able
to handle, fairly, the increasing number of doping cases coming before
its panels.
E. The Development and Application of Key Legal Doctrines
Even though the rules governing doping cases come from the IFs and
the World Anti-Doping Code, CAS and AAA-CAS play a large role in
developing and even modifying those rules. In particular, three key
329. Pastorello v. USADA, CAS 2002/A/363, at para. 6.8 (June 27, 2002).
330. Demetis v. FINA, CAS 2002/A/432 (May 27, 2003).
331. Demetis v. FINA, CAS 2002/A/432, at para. 9.4.8-9.4.11 (citing Swiss law to justify
additional review in order to limit the risk of injustice).
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doctrines that have been developed by CAS play an important role in
doping cases. Those three doctrines: (1) the quasi-criminal nature of
doping cases, discussed below because they are not only important, but
they are uncertain and still developing; (2) strict liability; and (3) the
comfortable satisfaction burden of proof.
1. Quasi-Criminal Doctrine
Sport disputes, including the enforcement of doping rules, are
fundamentally private law matters of contract obligations. However,
the quantum of procedural protections due athletes under notions of
general principles of law, basic concepts of fairness, and the growing
body of sports lextiva can depend on whether doping cases are
considered criminal by nature.33 2  If doping cases are considered
criminal by nature, then matters such as the burden of proof and
permissible defenses will be affected.
When analyzing the question of whether doping cases are criminal in
nature, CAS panels have focused on the consequences and sanctions
being imposed. In the majority of cases, CAS and AAA-CAS panels
have found the consequences to be penal.333 Because doping cases are
criminal in nature, athletes are entitled to procedural protections such as
332. See B. v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II
1998-2000 330 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (examining the scope of strict liability and proof
requirements in doping cases), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
333. See id. (finding doping investigations are quasi-private procedures); see also Demetis v.
FINA, CAS 2002/A/432 (agreeing that sanctions are similar to criminal penalties); H. v. FIM,
CAS 2000/A/281 (Dec. 22, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 410 (Matthieu Reeb,
ed. 2002) (holding that the "special circumstances of each case 'should be reviewed when
determining sanctions'), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005); C. v. FINA, CAS 95/141 (Apr. 22, 1996), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 215
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (implying doping sanctions are private in nature), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); N. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS
92/73 (Sept. 10, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 153 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998)
(holding sanctions are dependent on the level of culpability of the athlete), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); USADA v. Neben, AAA-CAS 30
190 00713 03 (Oct. 16, 2003) (applying a strict liability standard), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration -ruling-10 2 l.2003_neben.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005); USADA v. Vencill, AAA-CAS 30 190 00291 03 (July 24, 2003) (finding doping
sanctions to be quasi-criminal), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/
arbitrationruling
-
7 24 2003_Vencill.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). But see N., J., Y., W. v.
FINA, CAS 98/208 (Dec. 22, 1998), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 234 (Matthieu
Reeb, ed. 2002) (finding doping cases to be non-criminal in nature), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); Blackwelder v. USADA, AAA-
CAS 30 190 00012 02 (May 17, 2002) (noting the proceeding is not criminal and "principles of
criminal law do not generally apply when reviewing sanctions proposed by USADA"), available
at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/arbitration-ruling-5-22 2002_
blackwelder.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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the presumption of innocence. 334  However, while the imposition of
penal sanctions requires a showing of intent in most domestic legal
systems, CAS panels have been able to reconcile the imposition of
penal sanctions with the use of the strict liability doctrine. 335  These
panels have found that the difficulty of proving intent and the need to
rid sport of drugs justify use of the strict liability doctrine. 3 36  The
panels, perhaps as a way to rationalize allowing the use of the strict
liability doctrine in a criminal-like matter, make intent an element of the
penalty phase of the process.
337
However, this bifurcation of the process and divorce of the intent
element from the guilt phase of the process may be a problematic fix.
As will be explored below, the use of non-criminal, private law tools
such as strict liability has caused CAS doctrinal concerns and could,
unless better reconciled, continue to raise doubts about the soundness
and fairness of the doping control system.
2. Strict Liability
Cases involving application of the strict liability doctrine were slow
arrivals to CAS. Although CAS opened for business in 1986, it was not
until 1992 that a CAS panel published its first opinion on an appeal
from the IF application of the strict liability doctrine. 338 This resistance
to appeals was due in part to the mistrust or uncertainty about the new
CAS entity and partly due to the relatively rare enforcement of anti-
doping rules. Once strict liability cases came before CAS panels it
became clear that CAS, as a body, would struggle for a consistent
definition of strict liability.
334. See B. v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS 98/222 (determining the principle of 'in dubio pro
reo' or the benefit of the doubt is applicable in doping investigations).
335. See C. v. FINA, CAS 95/141 (asserting lack of strict liability would make the "fight
against doping ... practically impossible"); H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (finding that the "high
objectives and practical necessities of the fight against doping amply justify the application of a
strict liability standard" (internal citations omitted)).
336. C. v. FINA, CAS 95/141; H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281.
337. C. v. FINA, CAS 95/141 (preferring a sliding scale of sanctions based on the athlete's
level of fault); H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (holding that the "special circumstances of each case"
should be reviewed when determining sanctions).
338. G.v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 91/53 (Jan. 15, 1992), DIGEsT OF CAS AWARDS 1986-
1998 79 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005).
The [CAS] wishes first of all to recall that, where doping of the taking of prohibited
substances in concerned, there is normally and generally in the sporting regulations of
Federations an inversion of the burden of proof in the sense that, as soon as the
presence of prohibited substances is detected, there is the presumption of a voluntary
act. It is then up to the athlete to produce evidence to the contrary.
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Some of the trouble that CAS had in refining the strict liability
doctrine can be attributed to the overlap of several steps or doctrines in
the doping adjudication process. Proof of a doping violation naturally
involves matters of burdens of proof and presumptions. Strict liability
is an end point in proving a doping violation; burdens of proof and
presumptions are tools or routes to the end conclusion of strict liability.
CAS panels have disagreed and struggled with the appropriate burdens
of proof and presumptions to reach or prove strict liability.339  And,
CAS panels have been plagued by the use of strict liability in what is
basically a penal process.
340
Another difficulty in finding a single definition of strict liability can
be blamed on the IFs. IFs and the 1OC itself have defined strict liability
differently. 341  CAS, as required by its rules and jurisprudence, must
apply the definition of strict liability found in the IFs rules.342  When
IFs disagree, the CAS definitions can disagree. However, CAS panels,
seeing the need for uniformity and fairness, have uniformly insisted that
any definition of strict liability abide by general principles of law and
339. See C. v. FINA, CAS 95/141 (Apr. 22, 1996), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 215
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (endorsing the presumption of the athlete's guilt, but allowing for
burden shifting by the athlete by providing exculpatory evidence), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); S. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS
91/56 (June 25, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 93 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998)
(upholding a presumption of guilt, but allowing the presumption to be overturned by proof to the
contrary, but not requiring peremptory evidence), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
340. See, e.g., N. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 92/73 (Sept. 10, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998 153 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (noting that, in this context, the concept of
strict liability imposes the burden of proof normally imposed on the accuser, on the accused),
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); see also B. v. Int'l
Triathlon Union, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 330
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (arguing that the rule of strict liability should be construed to go even
further than imposing a presumption of guilt on the accused athlete and should allow exoneration
only in a very limited set of specifically defined cases), available at http://www.kluwer
arbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
341. See, e.g., W. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 92/86 (April 19, 1993), DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998 161 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (noting the IF adoption of IOC rules to
conform with a strict liability standard), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005). Perhaps the most dramatic example of the disparate standards can be seen
in the definitions applied by FINA, on the one hand, and the International Shooting Union and the
IAAF on the other. Compare C. v. FINA, 95/141 (Apr. 22, 1996), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS
1986-1998 187 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (finding that strict liability required an irrefutable
presumption of guilt), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005)
with USA Shooting & Q. v. Int'l Shooting Union, CAS 94/129 (May 23, 1995), DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998 187 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (finding the Union's regulation of strict
liability different from the IOC regulation even though the Union argued the regulations were the
same), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
342. See USA Shooting & Q. v. Int'l Shooting Union, CAS 94/129 (applying definition of
strict liability found in IF's rules).
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natural justice.343
With all of this under consideration, the CAS has developed two
somewhat competing definitions of strict liability. The first, developed
early in the court's history, can be best described as a "simple legal
presumption." Under this definition, once the presence of a prohibited
substance is established, a rebuttable presumption of guilt, negligence,
or fault is created. The athlete may rebut this presumption by counter
evidence such as the act of a third person.344 Presumably, such counter
proof would allow the athlete to escape all sanctions and responsibility.
The second, now dominant definition, can be best labeled as "pure
strict liability." 345 Under this definition, any question of fault, intent, or
negligence is irrelevant: an athlete may not avoid a sanction by showing
an absence of fault. The concept is said to be similar to "civil liability,
without fault in tort, or comparable to product liability cases."
346
While pure strict liability seems to have won the day in CAS, its
panels have been uncomfortable with the potential harshness of the
doctrine and have developed two mitigating doctrines. The first
mitigating doctrine stems from the view that the strict liability doctrine
is akin to a penal sanction. The second mitigating doctrine requires a
vigorous analysis of the causal link that supports a finding of strict
liability.
Early in the CAS evaluation of the doctrine, strict liability was
viewed as "akin to a penal sanction." 347 Because it was akin to a penal
343. See B. v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS 98/222 (reasoning that strict liability "does not
eliminate the need to establish the wrongful act itself and the causal link .. "); S. v. Int'l
Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 91/56 (June 25, 1992) (viewing strict liability as a presumption as well as
burden).
344. See S. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 91/56 (allowing proof of intentional act of a third
party or faulty testing procedures to clear the athlete); see also B. v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS
98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 330 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002)
(viewing as proper that the accused athlete may present counter-evidence on the basic question of
guilt or culpability), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); G.
v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 92/63 (Sept. 10, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 115
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (reviewing evidence of an act by a third party as a valid method to
rebut presumption), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
345. See L. v. FINA, 95/142 (Feb. 14, 1996), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 225
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998) (outlining strict liability usage in doping cases), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
346. L v. FINA, CAS 95/142 (internal citations omitted).
347. N. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 92/73 (Sept. 10, 1992), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS
1986-1998 153 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 1998), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005).
[B]earing in mind the gravity of the measures which could be applied in this case, and
which are akin to penal sanctions, there is no doubt that, by applying the general
principals of law, the person responsible has the possibility of proving himself innocent
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sanction, general principles of law give every defendant the right to
prove his innocence by showing that the positive test result was the
result of the action of a third party or that the analysis carried out was
erroneous. 348 Then, after the IOC redefined the strict liability doctrine
in 1992, the CAS seemed to abandon the view of strict liability as a
penal sanction and saw it as "civil liability, without fault in tort."
349
Then, in 1999, the CAS seemed to return to the view that strict liability
indeed has aspects of a penal sanction.
350
In two successive decisions, the CAS declared that while athletes
were still responsible regardless of fault, they should be allowed to
rebut the presumption of guilt by showing no fault to a virtual
certainty. 35  This showing could be done by demonstrating that the
results were caused by force majeure circumstances or the wrongful act
of a third person.3  The CAS, by providing this opportunity to rebut
the finding of guilt, bifurcated the concept of strict liability.
Responsibility would still lead to sanctions, but the athlete could be
declared blameless. It seemed as though the CAS was still
uncomfortable with punishing in the absence of fault.
The CAS, or at least one CAS panel, then took focus on the
procedures accompanying the strict liability doctrine. In B. v.
International Triathlon Union, the panel started with the conclusion that
because strict liability is a quasi-penal process, general principles of law
and the requirements of a fair trial apply to the process. 353 That being
so, strict liability is a scheme that punishes the consequences, the
presence of a prohibited substance, or a previous act of consuming the
by providing proof to the contrary ....
Id.
348. N. v. Int'l Equestrian Fed'n, CAS 92/73.
349. L. v. FINA, CAS 95/142 (internal citations omitted).
350. See B. v. Int'l Judo Fed'n, CAS 98/214 (Mar. 17, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II
1998-2000 308 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) (finding that the athlete is innocent until the banned substance is found in his
body). The CAS found that:
Every athlete enjoys a presumption of innocence until such a time as the presence of a
banned substance in his body is established. It is a matter for the sports organization to
prove that presence; it is not required to prove intentional doping on the part of the
athlete. That intent, and his culpability, are presumed as soon as proof of the presence
of the banned substance has been furnished. The athlete can reverse this presumption
of guilt by showing that the case is not one of doping and that he is innocent.
Id.
351. Id.
352. B. v. Int'l Triathlon Union, CAS 98/222 (Aug. 9, 1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II
1998-2000 338 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005)
353. Id.
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prohibited substance. 354  This process of working backward from a
consequence to predicate act necessarily relies on a causal link between
the consequence and the act.355  General principles of law and the
requirements of a fair trial require that the causal link leave no doubt
that the consequence was caused by one single act, the prohibited act.
When that link cannot exclude other causes, the strict liability doctrine
356cannot be applied. B. v. International Triathlon Union therefore
required that the scientific presumption that linked the consequences to
the prohibited act to be beyond doubt. Thus, the CAS now recognized
the right to challenge the science that strict liability rests upon.
Since B. v. International Triathlon Union, CAS panels appear to have
agreed on a common basic definition of strict liability. That basic
definition accepts that proof of a banned substance in an athlete's body
is sufficient to prove a doping violation.357  Yet, CAS panels do not
seem ready to accept that the doctrine stops there. CAS panels have
implied that in the absence of fault, defined as either the intent to use a
prohibited substance or negligence in not preventing the ingestion of a
banned substance, a doping violation has not occurred.358 CAS panels
have spoken of strict liability as "a legal presumption and the allocation
of burdens of proof,' 359 and have concluded that despite the presence of
a banned substance in an athlete's body, athletes still have a right to
"discharge" themselves. 36  Discharging oneself according to the CAS
means that the forbidden substance was "the result of an act of
malicious intent by a third party" or that test results were "impaired by
procedural defect." 361 Thus, it appears that the CAS does not employ
354. Id.
355. Id. (reasoning that "[tihe principle of the strict liability rule does not exempt the sports
federations [from proving] the existence of a doping offense.... [The] rule does not eliminate the
need to establish the wrongful act itself and the causal link between the wrongful act and its
consequences").
356. Id.
357. See Strahija v. FINA, CAS 2003/A/507 (Aug. 11, 2003) (finding a doping offense occurs
when a "prohibited substance is found within a competitor's body tissue or fluids"); Baxter v.
Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (Oct. 15, 2002) (citing earlier cases as establishing the
strict liability definition), available at http://www.britski.org.uk/baxter.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2005); H v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (Dec. 22, 2000), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 410
(Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (determining the general rule under strict liability to be a finding of a
forbidden substance in urine and test results not affected by procedural defects in a laboratory),
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
358. See Baxter v. Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (reviewing a charge of doping and
finding no intent by athlete, but still holding athlete liable for use of an illegal substance).
359. Demetis v. FINA, CAS 2002/A/432.
360. H. v. FIM, CAS 2000/A/281 (finding that "common principles of law and the human
rights of the accused" allow the athlete an attempt to challenge the panel's findings).
361. Id.
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strict liability if a banned substance is found in an athlete's body.
Also since B. v. International Triathlon Union, panels have continued
to uphold strict liability doctrine and the no fault standard despite
finding doping sanctions-such as suspension from competition-to be
similar to penalties in criminal proceedings in which prosecutors bear
the burden of proving guilt.362  One reason CAS panels seem able to
accept these seemingly contradictory concepts are the conceptual
separation of the step of finding guilt and the step of determining the
penalty.363  While these steps are normally separated in a criminal
proceeding, the separation in doping cases emphasizes that questions of
fault are relevant in the penalty phase and minimal fault can reduce a
penalty. 364  In fact, one panel has gone as far as stating that the strict
liability doctrine applies to the question of disqualification from a
competition, but not necessarily the question of suspension from further
competition.
365
AAA-CAS panels, on the other hand, have not, like CAS panels,
expressed reservations about the strict liability doctrine working in
practice like absolute liability. AAA-CAS panels have routinely and
frequently stated that the USADA need only show the presence of a
prohibited substance in an athlete's sample to prove a doping offense.
366
No mitigating language or conditions have been used by AAA-CAS
panels to date. Thus, despite the characterization of doping cases by
many AAA-CAS panels as quasi-criminal, they continue to shun
criminal case constructs meant to protect the accused.
36 7
362. Demetis, CAS 2002/A/432.
363. For examples of cases affirming that an unintentional doping can result in reduced
penalties compared to an intentional doping, see Strahija, CAS 2003/A/507 and Demetis, CAS
2002/A/432.
364. Strahija, CAS 2003/A/507; Demetis, CAS 2002/A/432.
365. Baxter v. Int'l Olympic Comm., CAS 2002/A/376 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.britski.org.uk/baxter.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). "Consistent CAS law has held
that athletes are strictly responsible for substances they place in their body and that for purposes
of disqualification (as opposed to suspension), neither intent nor negligence needs to be proved
by the sanctioning body." Id.
366. See USADA v. Cherry, AAA-CAS 30 190 00463 03 (Nov. 24, 2003) (noting that IAAF
rules determine a doping offense has occurred when a prohibited substance is present in the
athlete's body), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/
arbitrationruling.l l24 2003_.Cherry.pdf. (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); Neben v. UCI, AAA-CAS
30 190 00713 03 (Oct. 21, 2003) (applying strict liability), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration - rulings/arbitration-ruling- 021_2003_Neb
en.pdf. (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); USADA v. Vencill, AAA-CAS 30 190 00291 03 (July 24,
2003) (noting that knowledge by the athlete in taking a prohibited substance is immaterial),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/arbitration-ruling
7_24 2003_Vencill.pdf. (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
367. Vencill, AAA-CAS 30 190 00291 03.
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3. Comfortable Satisfaction Standard of Proof
The standard of proof in a doping charge is in most cases dictated by
the applicable IF rules, causing great confusion. Historically, the CAS
standard of proof has varied between different IFs. For example, until
recently the IAAF used a "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" while
FINA has at times used a preponderance of the evidence standard.368
However, the Olympic Movement, through the World Anti-Doping
Code, is attempting to create one uniform standard of proof for all IFs in
doping cases. The IOC, by requiring all IFs to adopt the World Anti-
Doping Code in order to be a member of the Olympic Games, is
creating the uniform standard of proof "to the comfortable satisfaction
of the hearing body." 369 While the standard has been codified in the
World Anti-Doping Code, it was CAS that developed the standard and
it will be CAS that will refine the standard.
The first use of the comfortable satisfaction standard of proof may
have occurred in the Australian case of Briginshaw v. Briginshaw.370 In
Briginshaw, the Australian Supreme Court searched for the appropriate
standard of proof to establish wrong doing or fault in a divorce
proceeding. As the foundation of the Court's analysis, it established
that a divorce proceeding was neither a criminal nor a quasi-criminal
proceeding.371  Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not
required as is required in all criminal matters. 372 Yet, on the other hand,
while the Court said that a divorce proceeding is a civil matter, it was
not a routine civil matter that employedproof by a preponderance of the
evidence (or balance of probabilities). 3 '  A divorce case was different
368. See INT'L Ass'N OF ATHLETIC FED'N, COMPETITION RULES 33 (2004-05) (detailing the
standard of proof required by the IAAF), available at http://www.iaaf.org/newsfiles/23484.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005). The rules state:
The standard of proof shall be whether the IAAF, the Member or other prosecuting
authority has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable satisfaction of
the relevant hearing body, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is
made. This standard of proof is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.; see IAAF v. Boulami, CAS 2003/A/452, para. 4.3 (Nov. 19, 2003) (citing IAAF rule 21.9
requiring IAAF to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that doping occurred).
369. WADA CODE, supra note 131, § 3.1 (2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/
rtecontentldocument/codev3.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005). "The standard of proof in all cases
is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at § 3.1.
370. Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336.
371. Id. at 347. "A petition for dissolution of marriage is not quasi-criminal, whatever the
grounds." Id. at 350 (internal citations omitted).
372. Id. at 347.
373. Id. at 361.
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historically, but more importantly because it involved allegations of
wrongdoing, even allegations of immorality, a higher level of proof than
by a preponderance of the evidence was needed.374 Stressing that the
burden of proof depends on the seriousness of the allegation or gravity
of the consequences and that the presumption of innocence must be
given weight, the court concluded that "the nature of the allegation
requires (proof) to a comfortable satisfaction."
375
After Briginshaw, Australian courts used the comfortable satisfaction
standard of proof in professional misconduct cases, 376 unfair trade
practice cases,37 7 immigration cases, 378 and civil rights 
cases. 37 9
However, the Australian courts have refused to use the standard in
criminal or quasi-criminal cases.380  The Australian experience
therefore instructs us that the comfortable satisfaction burden of proof
can be employed civil matters where allegations of misconduct or
immorality are involved, but not criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings.
It further teaches that the quantity of proof is higher than a
preponderance of the evidence, but not quite as high as beyond a
reasonable doubt; exactly where in that range, however, is uncertain.
a. CAS Use of the Standard
Possibly because of its relative newness, only a handful of CAS
panels have used the comfortable satisfaction standard. Further, those
374. Id. at 365-66.
375. Id. at 350.
376. Murphy v. The Bar Assoc. of New South Wales (2001) N.S.W.S.C. 1191 at para. 21
(citing Briginshaw to warrant caution in making a determination of liability).
377. See Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Pauls, Ltd., (2002) 1586 F.C.R. 43
(noting that the applicable standard of proof is that "[t]he facts proved must from a reasonable
basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may
reasonably be satisfied") (quoting Jones v. Dunkel (1959) 101 C.F.R. 298 at 305 (emphasis
omitted)); Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Mar. Union of Austl. (2001) 1549 F.C.R.
56 (reasoning that the civil standard of reasonable satisfaction may take into consideration the
gravity of the allegations in determining whether a fact has been proven to the requisite
satisfaction of the court).
378. Sun v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 F.C.R. 103, 123 (finding
Briginshaw required "cogent evidence" to determine bias and ultimately liability); Wati v.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 71 F.C.R. 103, 113-14 (determining the level
of proof required is "the balance of probabilities" or "reasonable satisfaction").
379. Maced. Teachers' Ass'n of Vict., Inc. v. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm'n
(1998) 91 F.C.R. 8, 42 (stating that Briginshaw provides guidance to applying the level of proof
in civil matters involving serious allegations).
380. Thomas v. The Queen (1960) 102 C.L.R. 584 (Austl.) (insisting that criminal liability
could be had only upon a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and nothing less), available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/high%5fct/102clr58
4
.html?query=% 7 e+
thomas+v+the+queen (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
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panels have not discussed or examined the standard very extensively.
The first panel to employ the comfortable satisfaction standard was the
Kornev and Ghoulie v. International Olympic Committee ad hoc panel
at the Atlanta Games in 1996.381 Though unreported, the Kornev panel
is quoted as stating, in a doping case, that the "ingredients must be
established to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind
the seriousness of the allegation which is made." 382 That language was
next used by the N., J., Y., W. v. FINA panel in 1998. The N., J., Y., W.
panel was careful to point out that the comfortable satisfaction standard
was less than the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, but
more than the ordinary civil standard of a preponderance of the
evidence. Thus, a lower standard of proof than is required in a criminal
case is appropriate in doping cases, according to the N., J., Y., W panel,
because disciplinary cases are not of a criminal nature.38 3  Rather,
according to the panel, disciplinary cases are of a private law of
association nature.38
4
CAS panels that have used the comfortable satisfaction standard after
N., J., Y., W. have not discussed the standard's meaning or the notion of
whether it is a non-criminal standard.385 However, many CAS panels
since N., J., Y., W. have characterized disciplinarfy cases involving
doping to be criminal or quasi-criminal in nature.3 8  Considering the
N., J., Y, W. panel premise that the comfortable satisfaction standard is
a non-criminal standard and that the other CAS panels have found
doping cases to be criminal in nature, there is, at the least, a question
about the doctrinal foundation and the appropriateness of using the
comfortable satisfaction standard in doping cases.
Problematically, where the standard falls between the preponderance
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt standard is unclear. Is
proof to a comfortable satisfaction closer to proof beyond a reasonable
381. N., J., Y., W. v. FINA, CAS 98/208 (Dec. 22, 1998), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS H 1998-
2000 234 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (citing Kornev & Ghouliev v. Int'l Olympic Comm., OG
96/003/004 (unpublished)), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
382. Id.
383. Id. (adopting the test established in Kornev).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., Strahija v. FINA, CAS 2003/A/507 (Aug.11, 2003) (affirming that the standard
of proof falls between criminal and civil standards), available at http://www.sportslaw.nl/
categorieen/print.asp?p-nr--42 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005); B. v. FINA, CAS 99/211 (June 7,
1999), DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000 255 (Matthieu Reeb, ed. 2002) (finding that a
charge of testing manipulation against an athlete includes elimination of mens rea), available at
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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doubt because doping cases are at the least quasi-criminal in nature?
Or, is proof to a comfortable satisfaction closer to the preponderance of
the evidence standard because doping cases are private in nature?
Before the comfortable satisfaction standard becomes entrenched in
CAS practice, these basic questions should be answered. These
questions are important because, if doping cases truly are criminal in
nature and if the comfortable satisfaction standard is a private-civil law
standard, then, at the least, the CAS is being doctrinally untrue and
inconsistent by concluding that a private-civil law standard can be used
in a criminal like proceeding. At the worst, CAS is permitting due
process violations by allowing the imposition of penal sanction with a
non-criminal standard of proof.
b. AAA-CAS Use of the Standard
AAA-CAS panels have used the comfortable satisfaction standard
more often than CAS panels have. This is largely due to the fact that
the USADA protocol and the Supplementary Procedures call for the use
of Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code ("OMADC"), which has
been superseded by the World Anti-Doping Code, when IF rules are
silent on a matter. The OMADC uses the comfortable satisfaction
387
standard. However, there is some Juestion as to whether IF
standards have been used in all cases. 38 Nevertheless, AAA-CAS
panels, just like CAS panels, have not examined or discussed the
standard extensively.389  Furthermore, AAA-CAS panels have not
387. See USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 110 (discussing the OMADC procedures to
determine violations); WADA CODE, supra note 131, cmt. § 3.1 (noting the standard is
comparable to the one "applied in most countries to cases involving professional misconduct"),
available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v3.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2005).
388. In USADA v. Cherry, the comfortable satisfaction standard was used despite the fact that
at the time of the positive test and the time of hearing, the IAAF used the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. USADA v. Cherry, AAA-CAS 30 190 00463 03 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/arbitration-ruling-I 1L24_2003_Cher
ry.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
389. USADA v. Cherry, AAA-CAS 30 190 00463 03 (Nov. 24, 2003) (applying the
comfortable satisfaction standard without explaining elements of standard), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/arbitration-ruling-I 1 24 2003_Cher
ry.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); see also USADA v. Sbeih, AAA-CAS 30 190 001 100 03 (Mar.
25, 2004) (confirming the strict liability standard), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/
active/arbitration.rulings/arbitration ruling_3_25_.2004_sbeih.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005);
USADA v. Neben, AAA-CAS 30 190 00713 03 (Oct. 20, 2003) (applying the comfortable
satisfaction standard), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitrationrulings/
arbitration.ruling10 21 2003_Neben.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2005); USADA v. Moninger,
AAA No. 30-190-00930-02 (April 2, 2003), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/
files/active/arbitration.rulings/arbitration ruling_4_3_2003_- Moninger.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2005) (applying the comfortable satisfaction standard); Blackwelder v. USADA, AAA-CAS 30
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explained if a comfortable satisfaction is closer to a preponderance of
the evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Like CAS panels, AAA-CAS panels have not agreed on the nature of
doping cases, thus failing to clarify the foundation of the comfortable
satisfaction standard. Clarifying the foundation of the comfortable
satisfaction standard, namely whether it is a criminal or private-civil law
standard of proof in origin, could show whether it is high standard of
proof closer to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or a lower standard of
proof closer to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Many AAA-
CAS panels have, without elaboration, declared that the comfortable
satisfaction standard is appropriate despite the quasi-criminal nature of
doping cases. 390 Yet, other AAA-CAS panels have found doping cases
to not be criminal proceedings, thereby justifying the use of a standard
other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.39 1 Just like the unsettled
foundation of the standard in CAS jurisprudence, the unsettled nature of
the AAA-CAS jurisprudence on the standard should be settled. If
doping cases are truly quasi-criminal proceedings and the comfortable
satisfaction standard is a private law, civil cause of action, standard of
proof, due process violations could occur.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CAS and its affiliates are necessary, beneficial, and innovative
institutions in the world of lex sportive. They have been a leader in
developing and modernizing sports law. However, the structure of the
CAS and-as also analyzed in this Article-AAA-CAS, are outdated
and ill-suited to properly handle all of the types of disputes presented to
them. Their weaknesses are particularly glaring in perhaps the most
explosive type of matters the CAS handles: doping cases. This is even
more troublesome considering the increased vigilance in the
international sports community towards doping, and the potentially
exponential leap in CAS influence if professional sports adopt their
rules and procedures.
The CAS and the AAA-CAS were constructed as arbitration
institutions. However, doping cases are different from disputes that can
be easily and equitably settled by arbitration. Doping cases are
190 00012 02 (May 17, 2002) (adopting a higher standard of comfortable satisfaction instead of
the civil standard of balance of probabilities), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/
active/arbitration rulings/arbitration ruling_5 22 2002_blackwelder.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2005).
390. Cherry, AAA-CAS 30 190 00463 03 (applying the comfortable satisfaction standard).
391. See Blackwelder, AAA-CAS 30 190 00012 02 (noting the proceeding is not criminal and
applying the comfortable satisfaction standard).
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accusatory and quasi-criminal in nature and therefore fundamentally
different from the typical contract dispute decided by arbitration. The
processes and machinery for deciding quasi-criminal cases, such as
doping charges, are inherently different from the processes and
machinery for deciding contract type cases.
As several CAS panels have noted, doping sanctions are penal in
nature and as such, require certain protections for the accused.
392
Among those protections are the presumption of innocence and the right
to "discharge" oneself.393  To those protections, an unbiased and
independent tribunal and methods to ensure equal protection and due
process should be added. These protections are necessary because the
basic objective of doping cases, like that of criminal cases, is to
determine guilt.
On the other hand, the basic objective of settling contract disputes
and other disputes typically settled by arbitration is to find an equitable
solution or middle ground that best fits the circumstances of the
particular dispute. Arbitration, with its flexible and less formal
structure is designed specifically to settle contract disputes. However, a
flexible and less formal structure may not ensure equal protection and
due process in guilt determination, or quasi-criminal proceedings like
those necessary in doping cases.
The CAS's current structure is excellent for deciding contract
disputes, however, it is inadequate, and should be modified for doping
cases. The CAS should consider developing a second chamber, with
separate procedures and arbitrators, to hear doping cases. Such a
second chamber would draw its arbitrators form a separate master list of
arbitrators, choose its arbitrators in a different way, and adopt
procedures to ensure equal treatment of all accused athletes.
The CAS has been making progress toward the fair treatment of
accused athletes. CAS panels have used principles of fairness to soften
what might otherwise be an unfair result under the applicable IF
rules. 394  Also, the CAS rules attempt to insulate arbitrators for
improper outside influences395 and its panels are attempting to
harmonize the rules and principles that it applies to accused athletes in
392. See supra note 333 (using CAS cases finding sanctions are penal in nature).
393. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying text (discussing an athlete's ability to counter
charges of doping).
394. See supra notes 347-52 and accompanying text (discussing the CAS procedure that
allows an athlete to defend against charges given under strict liability).
395. See supra Part III.B (discussing CAS and AAA-CAS procedures for selecting
arbitrators).
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the name of increased fairness. 396
Despite this movement in the direction of equity for accused athletes
in doping cases, more steps must be taken. The CAS, and particularly
the AAA-CAS, should take the following steps to ensure the fairness of
doping hearings and-particularly for the AAA-CAS-to answer
doubts about legitimacy. First, arbitrators on the master list drawn upon
in doping cases should have no current or recent connections with the
governing bodies of the Olympic Movement or athletes that have been
accused of doping violations. Second, the arbitrator selection process
should do away with, or at the least minimize, the practice of parties
appointing arbitrators. Third, the burden of proof used in doping cases
should be more like that used in criminal cases. And, fourth, a
mechanism, such as a single supervisory panel, should be created to
reconcile conflicting precedent to ensure equal treatment and remove
some of the arbitrariness of panel decisions.
The doping cases growing out of the BALCO investigation, with
their unique issues of proof and hurried nature as the Olympics
approached in the summer of 2004,397 created, in a sense, a moment of
truth for the CAS, and particularly the AAA-CAS. If the CAS and the
AAA-CAS are to continue and even improve their legitimacy, they
should consider the charges suggested above. And, as displayed by this
analysis, the CAS must shed its original commercial dispute settlement
structure and adapt to the unique demands of settling doping
accusations.
396. See supra Part Ill.D (discussing the use of precedent in CAS and AAA-CAS panels).
397. Pete Carey, Lifetime Ban sought for Montgomery; Doping agency alleges use of illegal
substances, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2004, § 4, at 3.
1272 [Vol. 36
